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Part One: Introduction and a Brief Lode Back
A c c o la d e s
On October IS, 1990 the Nobel Peace Prize committee in Oslo, 
Norway announced the 1990 recipient o f their prestigious award. 
The award marked a departure from a long-standing trend in which 
the committee tended to discriminate against the leaders of 
superpowers. Indeed, the 1990 Nobel Prize winner was the head of 
a major superpower: Mikhail Sergeiyivich Gorbachev, the President 
of the Soviet Union. This marked the first time since Woodrow 
Wilson won the award in 1919 that the leader of a global 
superpower would win the award by himself. There was good 
reason for the committee's reluctance in presenting the award to 
such powerful men. The world's superpowers had constructed 
stockpiles of nuclear weapons, divided the world into hostile camps, 
and used force on smaller states. So why did the committee finally 
decide to award the prize to a superpower leader? What did Mikhail 
Gorbachev do to facilitate world peace?
The committee commented that Gorbachev received the award 
"for his historic efforts towards disarmament, dismantling the old 
communist order in Eastern Europe and ending the Cold War.”1 
While all three of these reasons are important to the current world 
order, this paper will concentrate on the committee's reference to 
Gorbachev's "dismantling the old communist order in Eastern 
Europe." This is a too simplistic interpretation. Gorbachev did not 
decide to push Eastern Europe into a new political vantage. Implying
'Thom Shankcr, "Gorbachev Wins Nobel Pri*c," The Chicago Tribune. October
16, 1990 p. I.
that he did gives Gorbachev far too much credit and perhaps 
insinuates that he had more control over recent events than he 
actually had. What Gorbachev did do, though, is refuse to invoke a 
policy that had been the cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy for 
years--the Brezhnev Doctrine. In essence, Gorbachev received the 
Nobel Peace Prize for his decision not to utilize the Brezhnev 
Doctrine.
Although there was obvious satisfaction in Moscow for the 
award, there was also a sense of unease. Gennadi Gerasimov, the 
spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry, quickly noted that the award 
"certainly was not the Nobel Prize for economics."2 Gerasimov's 
comments reflected the Soviet regime's obvious frustration about 
failed efforts to revitalize their economy. As Gerasimov hints, 
Gorbachev may have contributed to world peace, but he may have 
had motives that were not completely altruistic. Other Soviets were 
less than enthusiastic about the Soviet Union's new niche in the 
international community. Victor Alksnis, a deputy from Latvia, 
glumly stated, "We have become a superpower without allies.”1 The 
two comments remind us that, awards aside, Gorbachev's choice 
whether to invoke the Brezhnev Doctrine was a difficult and 
controversial one.
This paper is intended to be a history of the Brezhnev Doctrine, 
analyzing its origins and rationale, its applications and the reasons 
for its demise. To understand the Brezhnev Doctrine, it is necessary 
to take a brief look at Soviet foreign policy in general and to
2.SIiankcr, p. 6.
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appreciate the importance placed on Eastern Europe. The Brezhnev 
Doctrine was a means of Soviet policy and not an end in itself. The 
goal o f the Soviet Union was to implement the policy to strengthen 
the Soviet Union and the so-called international socialist movement. 
The scholars who were surprised by its disuse in 1989 (Laird, Safire, 
and Staar) seemed to have developed an attitude that the doctrine 
was more than the sum of its parts. They tended to place the policy 
on a pedestal and felt its disuse to be unthinkable. In 1987, Robbin 
Laird stated that "regardless of Gorbachev's intentions, Soviet 
domination over Eastern Europe dictates limits within which his 
policy must operate...."4 Laird put the cart before the horse. The
Brezhnev Doctrine never really constrained a leader's options, but 
was merely a policy which through the mid-1980s seemed beneficial.
Thus, as the rationale for the Brezhnev Doctrine's use was becoming
obsolete, some still professed that the Soviet leader would invoke the 
tested policy. By Winter 1989, this myth was shattered, and the
Brezhnev Doctrine was dead.
The Brezhnev Doctrine must also be put in its regional context. 
It is applicable to Soviet foreign policy with regard to Eastern Europe 
(with the possible exception of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979). A proper history of the Brezhnev Doctrine includes a brief 
history of Soviet attitudes towards the region. It also must consider 
the region's attitudes towards the Soviet Union. In general, the 
communist regimes of Eastern Europe were never legitimate. The 
populations always looked upon them as being imposed. J.P. Brown
4 Robbin Laird. Soviei Foreign Policy, p .  2.
would speak o f "the Soviet Union’s continual dilemma in Eastern 
Europe,"5 th is  Soviet dilemma was one of fostering "viable" regimes 
which could still be tightly knit into a "cohesive" alliance. This was 
never an attainable goal, and the Soviets would have to choose 
between viability and cohesiveness. The Brezhnev Doctrine was a 
policy in response to this dilemma in which Moscow chose to foster a 
cohesive regional commonwealth. It offered the socialist countries a 
firm guideline of what was acceptable to Moscow and what could not 
be tolerated.6 Thus, again, it is important to see the Brezhnev 
Doctrine within other larger parameters of Soviet foreign policy anil 
not as a limiting factor on the remainder of Soviet policy.
The Brezhnev D octrine
What was the policy that became to be known as the Brezhnev 
Doctrine? Like most so-called doctrines, the name is a bit misleading. 
Never did Brezhnev ever publicly state, "I have developed a doctrine 
and it is...", but ironically that is essentially how the doctrine 
received its name. In August 1968, Soviet tanks put an end to the 
Prague Spring. Later, in September, there appeared several articles 
explaining the recent actions. These justifications for the Czech 
invasion, coupled with Brezhnev's own personal statements, came to 
be known as the Brezhnev Doctrine. The first important article on 
the invasion appeared on September 22, 1968, in Pravda. The 
article was very hostile to the West, blaming the recent events in 
Czechoslovakia on them:
SJ.F. Brown, Eastern Europe and Communist Rule, p. xii.
6Alvin Z. Rubinstein. Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II. p. 67.
5Some people still are not convinced that forever have 
gone those times, when imperialistic eggressors 
succeeded in alternating the correlation of forces in 
Europe in their own benefit. The fact, that there are 
such dreamers who not only dream, but also act, is 
confirmed by the policy of the West in regard to 
Czechoslovakia.7
Thus, it was not a simple case of Soviet (and Warsaw Pact) 
intervention in Czechoslovakia. The Western counterrevolutionary 
efforts were "ruined by the entrance into Czechoslovakia of allied 
forces, arriving to help a brother people."* The Soviets had the right 
to intervene in order to aid an ally. This is conventional logic and
hardly merits the naming of a doctrine, but within a week, the
Soviets would claim that even if the action taken was not simple self- 
defense against Western aggression, the use of force would still he 
justified. This second justification would come to be known as the 
Brezhnev Doctrine.
On September 26, 1968 there appeared another article in 
Pravda. This article, written by Sergei Kovalev, justified the invasion 
not in terms of self-defense and fighting Western imperialism, but 
rather spoke of a socialist commonwealth to which all socialist states 
owe allegiance:
This means that each Communist party is responsible 
not only to its own people but also to all the socialist 
countries and to the entire Communist movement... 
in a system of other states constituting a socialist 
commonwealth (an individual state| cannot be free 
from the common interests o f the commonwealth.9
^Pravda, September 22, 1968, (personal translation unless stated otherwise), p. 
I.
* I bid.
9Pravda.. September 26, 1968, p. 1.
This did Rot appear to be extremely threatening, but the article 
further referred to the Soviet Union as the "chief force" of the 
commonwealth. This implied that if states had duties to the 
commonwealth as a whole, they then also had obligations to its chief 
fatee, the Soviet Uoieii. t i e  doctrine implied that the Soviet Union 
was to determine what was appropriate behavior within the socialist 
commonwealth. Essentially, the Soviets imposed a limited principle 
of national sovereignty on the region.
Brezhnev further reiterated this view in November. 1968. by 
stating, "When a threat arises to the cause of socialism in that 
country • a threat to the security of the socialist commonwealth as a 
whole - this is no longer merely a problem for that country's people, 
but a common problem, the concern of all socialist countries."10 
Brezhnev further stated that "the borders of Poland, the GDR and 
Czechoslovakia, as well as of any other Warsaw Pact member arc 
stable and inviolable. These borders are protected by all the armed 
might of the socialist commonwealth."11 Thus, the armed might of 
the commonwealth may be used in order to insure the security of the 
commonwealth as that security is determined by the entire 
Commonwealth, whose main member is the Soviet Union. At the 
24th Congress of the CPSIJ, Brezhnev applied this rationale to the 
recent invasion of Czechoslovakia. He summed up by stating. "We 
and the fraternal socialist countries then jointly took u decision to
10Rubinstcin, p. 96.
11 Ibid.
render international assistance to Czechoslovakia in defense of 
socialism.'*12
Thus, the case of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was one in which the 
Soviet Union deemed that the entire commonwealth was in danger.
"It is quite clear that an action such as military assistance to a 
fraternal country to end a threat to the socialist system is an 
extraordinary measure, dictated by necessity.”13 The Brezhnev 
Doctrine declared that in another situation, if forced to act, the Soviet 
Union would not hesitate to take such an extraordinary measure as 
intervention. The Brezhnev Doctrine was used to justify an invasion 
of an ally by its own allies because the policies of the victim were not 
conducive to the commonwealth as determined by the Soviet Union.
It was a Machiavellian statement. It stated what usually remained 
unspoken in diplomatic venues and sent a strong message not only to 
Eastern Europe, but to Washington as well. The Brezhnev Doctrine 
stated that Eastern Europe was firmly in Soviet hands, and during 
the Cold War the United States knew that Eastern Europe was 
nonnegotiable.
H istorica l P ersp ective
It is very important to note that Brezhnev did not radically 
alter Soviet policy, nor Russian policy for that matter, towards 
Eastern Europe. In fact, there was a Brezhnev Doctrine, of sorts, 
before Brezhnev. In order to understand the Soviet response to 
Eastern European affairs one must go back to Tsarist Russia.
12Leonid Brezhnev, On the Policy of the Soviet Union and the International
Siluiliun, p. 91.
"Pravda  , Nov. 13, 196H. Translated in Charles Cali, The Bloc That hailed, p. 73.
8ll is important to look at Tsarist times because, as Adam Ulam 
would point out, there was a continuity in policy between Tsarist 
times and the Soviet era. The extent of the continuity can be argued 
in a different paper, but most agree that 1917 did not change 
everything in what was to become the Soviet Union.14 Despite 
Stalin’s famous speech in 1931 naming all the countries that had 
defeated backward Russia in the past, Russia actually gained 
territory through military expansion throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. In 1721, Peter the Great defeated the Sw edes 
and established St. Petersburg. Later Catherine the Great’s reign 
would mark the largest territorial acquisitions since the 16th 
century.”15 The Russians partitioned neighboring Poland three times 
The common philosophy during this expansion was that which stops 
growing begins to rot.”16 The Tsarist conception of security was one 
driven by this view. It was also influenced by the feeling that an 
aggressive foreign policy was ... a remedy for domestic ills.”17 
Russian leaders were not satisfied with spheres of influence. They 
would much rather dominate a region to the satisfaction of their 
domestic population.
This conception of security, coupled with an international 
system that placed pressure on great powers to develop 
dependencies, pushed Russia into an imperialist program. One oi the
14For more on this sec Adam Ulam, Hxpansion and (\)cvisicMj i x  Also. P ro tean  
Urolf would argue that 1928 marked as big of a change in policy than 
1917.
15Fdward Acton, Russia, p. 40.
l6Ulam, p. 12.
17 Ibid. p. 9.
9ironies of World War I was that Russia, the only Allied great power 
to suffer a change of regimes, was also the most imperialist state. 
Despite having internal problems that drastically inhibited the war 
effort and a near crippled military after the opening debacle at 
Tannenberg, the Russians had many expansionist war aims. Ulam 
states, "An analyst of foreign policy taking a retrospective look at 
1914 ... would have found the country's resources and commitments 
overextended ."18 Yet expansion and domination were still seen as the 
answers. Russian war aims were directed not only against the 
Central Powers, but against her allies as well. Russia coveted lands 
from Poland, Iran, Turkey and China and demanded concessions in 
the Balkans. Paul Schroeder considered these goals to be clearly "the 
most imperialist" goals of any great power.19 That these demands 
were even made showed how infused Russian leadership was with 
their views on security. These were impossible goals, and it would 
destroy Russia to try to incorporate all of this territory; yet, the goals 
were pursued because of the philosophy of Russian leaders that 
equated land with security. Even at the twilight of their rule, 
expansion was seen as the answer. As late as 1917, deals were made 
with the French on Russian accession of Polish territory. Russian 
leaders were absorbed with the idea of expansion and control of 
their neighbors, a concept that would not change with the deposing 
of the Tsar.
18Ulam, p. 8.
19Paul Schrocdcr, Class lecture on 1/23/91.
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The Soviet Period
When the Bolsheviks consolidated their power during the civil 
war, the international situation they faced was much different than 
the post-World War Two scene. After the first World War, the Soviet 
Union was treated as an international pariah and was the only 
socialist state in the world. In this period, ideology had much more 
impact on foreign policy. The Bolsheviks truly believed in their 
cause and had a firm conviction that they were marking the 
beginning of the international socialist revolution. Lenin often 
contemplated sending Soviet aid to foster unrest in the West, even 
during the darkest days of the civil war. Lenin was thrilled to sec 
Bela Kun take power in Hungary, and the Bolsheviks awaited the 
world revolution with open arms.
Many point to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and say it is here 
that the Soviets learned about the realities of modern diplomacy. It 
was at Brest-Litovsk that Trotsky's "no war, no peace" proposal had 
failed. The Bolsheviks had entered the negotiations with declared 
contempt for traditional diplomacy, and their delegation was an 
unorthodox lot which included workers and peasants. They would 
leave Brest-Litovsk with the lesson of a reopened front by Germany 
and a new realization that the new Soviet stale would be forced to 
take part in traditional diplomacy.
Even after Brest, though, the Soviets would pursue non- 
traditional diplomacy. As Ulam describes, there was a natural strain 
in Soviet policy that viewed conflict in the world scene as a positive 
occurrence. The Comintern was formed to create a forum for the 
world socialist movement and also to cause disruptions in the West.
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This attitude was personified by Karl Radek. Radek was the 
Secretary of the Comintern and a revolutionary. He and other Soviet 
leaders saw Germany as the state that was ripe for revolution.
Indeed, Germany was in dire straits after World War I. When the 
French occupied the Ruhr in 1923, the German economy collapsed. 
Hyperflation was rampant, and the population became increasingly 
dissatisfied with the Weimar Republic. Seizing the moment, Radek 
went to Germany to assist the German communists in an attempt for 
power. However, economic recovery aided by the Dawes plan was 
forthcoming. The West did the unexpected ploy by cooperating to 
assist Germany in its recovery (only so she could pay France 
reparations). The German communists were defeated, and Radek 
was arrested. Soon after the German recovery, the Soviets had to 
realize that Germany was not going to experience proletarian 
revolution, To prepare for this, the Soviets had already come to 
terms with the German government--the very same government 
who would later defeat the German communists--by signing the 
Treaty of Rapallo in 1922. Rapallo marked an attempt by the Soviets 
to reenter the international community by joining with the other 
international pariah-*Weimar Germany.
There was another lesson to be learned from the chaos in 
Germany. While domestic upheaval might present opportunities for 
socialism, it also created opportunities for the extreme right. The 
German communists had failed to take power, and by 1933, Germany 
was under the control of Adolph Hitler, and the Soviets were forced 
to reevaluate their policy.
12
Stalin had won his power struggle with Trotsky, which is often 
reduced to a debate between "international revolution” and 
"socialism in one country." This is an oversimplification of the 
arguments; the two were not as different as one would assume by 
the names given to their philosophies. However, Stalin did 
dramatically change the premise of Soviet foreign policy. Whereas 
Lenin would have considered aid to foreign revolutionaries, no 
matter the condition of the Soviet Union, Stalin thought in terms of 
what would benefit the Soviet Union the most. In 1934 the 
Comintern instructed all member parties to form a Popular Front 
with other non-socialist parties. The rationale for these instructions 
was for each party to lobby for the policy that best suited the Soviet 
Union and not their own communist parties.
By 1933 the world scene appeared hostile to Moscow. The 
possibility of another German invasion now appeared real. After 
years of bashing the League of Nations as the "imperialist robbers' 
club," the Soviet Union decided to join it. Maxim Litvinov was named 
Foreign Minister, and a genuine attempt was made at collective 
security. When this appeared to be unable to improve the Soviet 
Union's security, Stalin made a bold ploy. If ideology had an 
influence in 1939, it was hard to find. Stalin had made a pact with 
the devil.
The Molotov - Von Ribbentrop pact provided the Soviet Union 
with some breathing room. It was a realpolitik move and showed 
how Stalin was willing to brush aside ideology when the security of 
the state was endangered. It also showed the continuity in territorial 
expansion from Tsarist days, as the secret agreement allowed the
Soviets to recapture much of the territory forfeited after the first 
world war. When Operation Barbarossa began in 1941, Stalin would 
take the lessons he learned from the pre-war period with him into 
the post-war. One must first look out for the security of his own 
state, and diplomatic means were not sufficient to do this. He was 
determined to apply this lesson to Eastern Europe.
EarL-Iwo; The Applications of the Brezhnev Doctrine
Stalin in the Post-W ar Era
Indeed, Stalin did apply this philosophy to Eastern Europe alter 
the war. Never again would Eastern Europe be used as a springboard 
for invasion of the Soviet Union. Regimes were installed in all 
countries liberated by the Red Army. Stalin would develop a "belt of 
submissive Communist regimes ... dependent for their survival on 
Soviet troops."20 There was a recognizable four-stage pattern that 
this incorporation passed through, but for our purposes it is not 
necessary for a history of the process. It is sufficient to state that by 
1948, the Eastern European countries were all communist and were 
completely subservient to Moscow, as Stalin would not be 
comfortable with a simple sphere of influence. Indeed, Stalin had 
created a sphere of domination.
This was evident by Soviet meddling in the region. Rubinstein 
states, "Stalin used alliances, trade and economic agreements, joint- 
stock companies, communist party and secret police contacts to 
entrench Soviet hegemony."21 A veritable ultimatum was given to 
Romania by Moscow : accept Petra Groza as your leader or cease to 
exist as an independent state.22 Slightly less bold was the Soviet 
interference in Czechoslovakia in 1948. After the war the Czech 
communist party was relatively popular and had actually garnered 
an electoral victory. The communists had control over many 
important posts in a coalition government. However, this was not
20Rubinstcin, p. 83.
21 Ibid. p. 63.
22Charlcs Gali, The Bloc That Tailed, (unless otherwise staled) p. 22.
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good enough for Stalin. In February, he ordered a coup which would 
leave the communists with complete control. As Jan Masaryk 
lamented after Stalin refused to allow Czech participation in the 
Marshall Plan, "I left for Moscow as minister of foreign affairs of a 
sovereign state. I am returning as Stalin's stooge."* 245 The mysterious 
death of Bulgarian leader Dimitrov in Moscow also showed how crude 
Stalinist diplomacy could be.24 Thus, Stalin ruthlessly demanded 
subservience, and he backed up this wish with the most powerful 
land army in the world.
Eastern Europe was now a Soviet buffer zone. This was carried 
out in a manner that would have pleased any Romanov. Indeed,
Stalin incorporated the Eastern bloc out of security reasons, fearing 
that if the Soviets did not grow, they may begin to rot. In sum, for 
Stalin, "security required control."25 A policy of such far-reaching 
scope cannot simply be explained by security factors, though, there 
were other reasons as well. There was a genuine belief that this 
territory "liberated" by the heroic red army should be under Soviet 
control. World War II was a Soviet victory, and all Soviet leaders 
would covet the gains achieved by the victorious Red Army. Stalin, 
Khrushchev and Brezhnev, with memories fresh in mind, could not 
tolerate any anti-Soviet regimes in any territory liberated by the Red 
Army.
There was also an economic element to Stalin's policy. Stalin 
brutally exploited the region so that the Soviet Union would recover
^Arnold Krammcr, The Forgotten Friendship, p. 69.
24Brown, p. 5.
25John C. Campbell, reprinted in Surah M. Terry, Soviet Policy in Eastern
Europe, p. 6.
faster from the Second World War. First, Stalin literally stole many 
essential factories and other elements from the Eastern European 
infrastructure. Second, he imposed reparation duties on countries 
like Bulgaria and East Germany. Third, he created joint-stock 
companies which were very biased against the area. Paul Marer 
estimated that Stalin extracted $14 billion from the area in the first 
decade after the war.26 This capital was necessary for the recovery 
of the Soviet Union. In typical Stalinist fashion, economic relations 
were executed in consideration of how they could benefit the Soviet 
Union.
it is important to note that East East trade (as it came to be 
known) was not a natural occurrence. In fact, "Eastern" Europe itself, 
as Gati notes, is an artificial creation. Formally, the region was 
known as Central Europe, and these slates were inclined to trade 
with the West. The new economic situation imposed by Stalin was 
unnatural to the historical development of the region and would only 
foster resentment for decades to come. As Heller and Fehrer
comment, Stalin ’created the artificial geopolitical unit called 'Eastern 
Europe' out of nations that had never had a common history....’’27
Zbigniew Brzezinski agrees with this assertion, stating, ”A single
crucial fact is the key to understanding the future of communism in 
Eastern Europe: Marxism-Leninism is an alien doctrine imposed on 
the region by an imperial power whose rule is culturally repugnant 
to the dominated people." Because of this, he felt. Eastern Europe 
would undergo an "organic rejection" of communism similar to the
26PauI Marer, reprinted in Terry, p. 156.
2^Agnes Heller and Ferenic Fehrer, "Gorbachev and Eastern Europe,” p. 416.
"human body’s rejection of a transplanted organ."28 Despite this 
colorful analogy, it is important not to emphasize solely the factors 
which portray the region as having no natural tendencies towards 
the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia, still stinging from the Western 
sellout of their seemingly insignificant country at Munich, had a
strong communist party. There also were some pro-Soviet feelings in 
other countries as well, but after Stalin ruthlessly incorporated these 
states, these feelings quickly turned into anti-Soviet sentiment.
Stalin felt that it was necessary to dominate the region for 
offensive reasons. No longer would the Soviet Union be in a 
defensive position. For years. Western military analysts would fear 
the Soviet "bolt from the blue" scenario. There is evidence that Stalin 
contemplated an attack towards the end of his life. A swiftly 
executed attack on NATO troops would only be possible if the Soviets 
already had troops in place in Eastern Europe. Thus, Stalin’s policy of 
domination in the region would enable him to keep troops in 
strategic locations. The psychological impact of this stance fueled the 
Cold War. The genuine fear in Western Europe that the Soviets 
would attack led to the formation of NATO. Thus, although the
United States never tried to "rollback" the Soviets from Eastern
Europe, Stalin's policy led directly to the heightened Western fears 
that were associated with Cold War.
Stalin also installed his ruthless policy out of ideological 
concerns. For years, the Soviets prophesied the impending doom of 
capitalism and the eventual socialist victory. Now Eastern Europe
28Zbignicw Br/.c/inski, , p. m .
could be created to serve as a beacon to the rest of the world as it 
displayed the advantages of socialism. It was necessary to possess 
strict control over the process in order to guarantee its success. The 
success of Eastern Europe could be seen as the beginning of the 
international proletarian revolution. Soon, the world would be 
socialist and capitalism defeated.
Stalin also wanted the states in the region to act as supporters 
of the Soviet Union. They would become useful in the newly created 
United Nations. No longer would the Soviet Union be isolated in the 
world community. She finally had allies who would support her in 
these forums. The East bloc states also would be useful as proxies of 
the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia made arms deals with the Ha^anah 
in 1948 which provided the Jewish state with much needed 
hardware in its War of Independence.29 These deals were always 
approved in Moscow. Thus, the Soviets could covertly pursue their 
foreign policy by using the Eastern European countries.
Therefore, after World War II, Stalin ruthlessly took control of 
Eastern Europe. The "Stalin Doctrine" required complete 
subservience on the part of the Eastern European states. These 
aforementioned reasons for Stalin’s creation of Eastern Europe as a 
subservient buffer region of the Soviet Union were the same as those 
for Brezhnev’s advocacy of his doctrine of limited sovereignty. In 
essence there was a continuity in Soviet foreign policy. Stalin s
29Krammer talks about this extensively throughout The Forgotten Friendship. 
These deals were quite elaborate and played an important part in 
Israel's victory in 1948. A sampling of the weapons sold by 
Czechoslovakia reveals 24,000 P-18 Mauser rifles, 5,015( Light) ZB-34 
machine guns, 12 16-ton tanks, 59 Spitfire IX fighter planes, and 4,184 2* 
kg. bombs. Sec pages 105-6 for a complete list.
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policy failed, though, to create legitimate regimes. This guaranteed 
that the empire could only be retained by force. When Stalin died in 
1953. he left his successors the empire to administer.
The Khrushchev Years
Nikita Khrushchev was not intent on simply continuing all of 
Stalin’s policies. Khrushchev did not believe in the extremes of 
Stalin’s diplomacy. In J.f;. Brown’s terminology. Khrushchev felt it 
more important to work on the ’’viability" of the Eastern bloc 
countries. In order to do so. the economic relationship with the 
region had to be altered. This created an environment more 
conducive to regional viability and required a change in Soviet 
policy. To insure cohesion. Khrushchev would "institutionalize" the 
alliance by working through the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) 
and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMHA). Khrushchev 
was willing to attempt greater bloc viability due to his own personal 
views on Soviet security and the Soviet economic condition.
The major signal of change from Moscow occurred at the 
Twentieth CPSU congress. In the infamous "secret speech,"
Khrushchev denounced the abuses of the "cult of Stalinism," He 
implied that more leeway would be afforded to Eastern European 
leaders and he acknowledged the "different roads to socialism." This 
was important to the region since the Soviet model had always been 
stressed by Stalin. It also represented a paradox in policy.
Khrushchev never intended to allow the Eastern European regimes to 
gravitate away from the Soviet Union. Thus, the regimes were 
granted the right to determine their own paths of development, but 
this development would still have to be approved by Moscow. Some
misunderstood this. Indeed, unwittingly, Khrushchev's own policy 
"set in motion in Eastern Europe additional pressures for changes 
that gathered momentum and threatened to unhinge the Soviet 
empire."30 Khrushchev proved in Hungary in 1956 that he never 
intended to let the Soviet empire become unhinged.
Basically, Khrushchev was dealing with the essential problem 
in Soviet foreign policy in the region. To what extent could Eastern 
European leaders be given autonomy, since in most of the region, 
truly independent regimes would be anti-Soviet? Khrushchev 
differed from Stalin in that he would offer some autonomy. This was 
more of a change in emphasis than a complete about-face in policy. 
The region still gave the Soviets advantages. Deep in the heart of the 
Cold War, its security benefits seemed important. Also, the policy of 
dominance could not be completely denounced because this would 
mean a tremendous loss of Soviet prestige if the East bloc countries 
were to denounce the Soviet model. This is especially important 
since Khrushchev rekindled the idea of wars of national liberation. 
Eastern Europe was still considered an example for the Third World. 
Also, the East bloc continued to act as proxies for the Soviets; the 
Czechs were now peddling their arms to the Egyptians.
CiacMgvyn.J n.Hungary
While Khrushchev did alter Soviet policy, he (and others in the 
government who were in power in 1956) cracked down in Hungary. 
The invasion of Hungary clearly showed that Khrushchev was not 
about to foster viability in a state if that meant it would leave the
30Rubinstcin, p. 86.
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commonwealth. In Hungary, the party had lost control of the 
situation, and Imre Nagy called for Hungary's leaving the Warsaw 
Pact. This was unacceptable to Moscow. There was a clear limit to 
what Khrushchev referred to as "the different roads to Socialism." As 
long as a state remained in the Warsaw Pact and had tight 
communist control, the Soviets would tolerate experimentation, but if 
it deviated from this formula, Moscow would strike.
Charles Gati rejects that the Soviet action was in response to 
Nagy's call for leaving the WTO. He states that the invasion occurred 
because of a Soviet "fear of all the uncertainties."11 They feared a 
domino effect in the region. If one country was allowed to gravitate 
away from the commonwealth, then others would follow. Thus, all 
the benefits of the region would be lost. This could not have been 
allow ed.
Rubinstein draws some important lessons from the events in 
Hungary. First, the Eastern European regimes were ultimately 
guaranteed only by the Soviet Red Army. Second, nationalism still 
remained in the region and was developing an increasingly anti- 
Soviet tinge.31 2 The most important lesson to be drawn in 
Washington, though, was thai Eastern Europe remained non- 
negotiable and was still deemed essential to the security and welfare 
of the Soviet Union.
It is interesting to note that an article which appeared in 
Pravda on November 22, 1957, referred to:
31 Gati, p. 41.
32Rubinslcin, p. 89.
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The socialist countries base their relations on 
principles of equality, respect for territorial integrity, 
state independence and sovereignty, and 
noninterference in one another's internal affairs. 
These are vital principles. However, they do not 
exhaust the essence of relations between them. 
Fraternal mutual aid is part of these relations. This 
aid is a striking expression of socialist 
internationalism .35
The "aid" that the article refers to is contrary to the principles of 
national sovereignty. It is the essence of "socialist internationalism." 
The principles enunciated in this article are remarkably similar to 
Kovalev's thesis in 1968. The Soviet Union has the right to "aid" a 
socialist state regardless of whether this "aid" involves sending tanks 
into Budapest or Prague.
The obvious lesson to be drawn is that for all the differences
between Khrushchev and Brezhnev, it can be argued that the article 
in Pravda offering justification for action in 1957 used very similar 
logic and terminology to the one in 1968 that would become to be 
known as the Brezhnev Doctrine. It might also be easy to lump 
Khrushchev in with Stalin since military answers were very much 
akin to Stalin. This would be inaccurate. First, Khrushchev had just 
begun to consolidate his power. This was never as absolute as 
Stalin's, as evidenced by Khrushchev's eventual ousting. Second. 
Khrushchev did alter both the economic relationship with Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet leadership's perceptions of their own security.
Khrushchev wanted to avoid the abuses of the Stalin era. The 
most obvious aspect of this in respect to Eastern Europe was in the 
economic realm. Khrushchev altered the terms of trade to the
^Pravda,  November 22, 1957.
advantage of the East bloc countries. No longer was exploitation the 
law. The price system was reformed in 1963, and the International 
Bank for Economic Cooperation (IBEC) was created with the purpose 
of facilitating intrabloc trade.*4 In fact, one can begin with 
Khrushchev to trace the actual economic drain that the region would 
eventually become on the Soviet Union. This fact did not trouble 
Khrushchev, who was truly optimistic about the future of 
communism.
This enthusiasm is exemplified in a Khrushchev speech made 
on January 14, I960, to the Supreme Soviet. First, Khrushchev 
commented on the international scene by claiming, ’’We have noted 
more than once that the international situation has definitely 
improved of late."** On the domestic scene he would argue that "the 
Soviet Union is going through a period of unprecedented upsurge in 
the entire national economy."*6 This was a common theme during 
Khrushchev's day. When Khrushchev uttered, "we will bury you," he 
merely meant in economic competition. Khrushchev proudly boasted 
that the day would soon come (he often cited twenty years as the 
date) when the Soviet Union would catch up, and then surpass, the 
United States in production and standard of living. This confidence 
extended into Eastern Europe as well. The East bloc would also, 
naturally, succeed and provide a fine example to the Third World of 
what good socialism could do.
*4Paul Lydolph, Geography of the U.S.S.R.. p. 413.
** Nikita Khrushchev, reprinted in Myron Rush, The International Situation
and Soviet Foreign Pcltix p 209.
*6lbid. p. 217.
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Economic Reform
Unlike Brezhnev, Khrushchev was willing to take risks in 
attempting to reform the Soviet economy. Upon taking over, 
Khrushchev implemented the sovnarkhozy reform. This reform was 
meant to make the economy run more efficiently by removing the 
ministerial tendency to prefer certain suppliers. Thus, Khrushchev 
could now replace “departmentalism" and remove the long-huuls that 
were associated with it. This way, geographical concerns could be
taken into consideration.17
Khrushchev, who always fancied himself a farmer, also set out 
to improve Soviet food production by plowing previously 
uncultivated land. The so-called Virgin Land program would make 
good use of lands in Northern Kazakhstan and in Western Siberia. In 
a short period of time, Khrushchev increased the amount of land 
used for farming. From 1954 to 1958, over 40 million hectares of 
new land were utilized.18
These were sweeping and innovative changes. Unfortunately, 
they were also unsuccessful. The sovnarkhozy reform merely 
replaced "departmentalism" with "localism,' which turned out to be 
equally unproductive. The Virgin Land campaign, despite initial 
successes, only led to land erosion and high input costs for 
unproductive - or at least unpredictable * land. Wadekin comments, 
"It has to be mentioned, however, that the expansion of agricultural
production into marginal areas (for example, the Virgin Lands
17Anders Aslund, Gorhachey-s... Slruinilc for Economic Reform, p. 113.
18Lydolph, p. 220.
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Campaigns...) has a negative impact on overall statistical data tor 
yields."19
More important than the lack of eventual success accrued from 
these reforms was the confidence that Khrushchev initially placed in 
them. It is in this context that one is able to understand the Soviet 
leader’s willingness to alter the terms of trade with Eastern Europe. 
The benefits of Stalin’s exploitative relationship with the area could 
be traded away since the Soviet economy was on the verge of rapid 
growth. There were political benefits to be accrued from the new 
policy as well. An improving economy in Eastern Europe, derived 
from the new positive Soviet trade, would increase the satisfaction of 
the populations there and increase the legitimacy of the regimes. 
Thus, Khrushchev felt that the strength of the Soviet economy 
enabled him to make economic concessions to Eastern Europe so that 
those regimes could become more viable.
BirPQlar Security
Khrushchev's views were also shaped by his views of the 
international scene. Khrushchev rejected the Marxist emphasis on 
the inevitability of war. Khrushchev realized that the advent of 
nuclear weapons rendered superpower war suicidal. Khrushchev felt 
that it was unnecessary for his country to pursue a policy of 
achieving strategic parity with the United States and instead stressed 
the deterrence of the Soviet arsenal Khrushchev commented that 
the "Soviet army's present armament makes our country completely
^9Karl*Eugcn Wadckin. reprinted in Class Notes Eton 357, p. 133.
impregnable.”40 41 To make this point clear to anyone in Washington, 
Khrushchev would boast:
The Soviet Army today possesses such armaments 
and such fire-power as no army has ever had. I 
want to reemphasize that we already have such an 
amount of nuclear weapons and atomic and 
hydrogen weapons and an appropriate number of 
rockets to deliver them to the territory of a potential 
aggressor - that if some madman were to provoke an 
attack on our country or on other socialist countries, 
we could literally wipe the country or countries 
attacking us off the face of the liarth.4 1
Of course, the fact that Khrushchev made such candid 
statements does not mean that he did not do so for political reasons. 
The entire concept of deterrence is based on demonstrating to your 
adversary your willingness and capability to respond against him.4 
Khrushchev obviously discussed Soviet military might because of 
this, but he also genuinely believed his own rhetoric. His confidence 
in the security of the Soviet Union enabled him to try to establish 
better relations with the United States and with his own allies.
On December 30, 1961, Khrushchev stated that Mour interests 
(concerning the United States) do not clash directly anywhere, either 
territorially or economically."4* It is hard to imagine the instigator of 
the "missiles of October" as a seeker of detente, but it is true that 
Khrushchev did try to de-emphasize the superpower conflict. In the 
spring of 1955, the Soviets pulled out militarily from Austria and 
signed a peace treaty respecting her neutrality. That same year the
40Khrushchcv, reprinted in Rush. p. 2 IK.
41 Ibid. p. 217.
4-Paul Diehl, Class lecture 9/26/90 
^K hrushchev, reprinted in Rush, p. 206.
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Soviets ceded Port Arthur to the Chinese and withdrew from the 
military base at Porkkala-Udd which was previously granted by 
Finland. Khrushchev also started the first genuine attempts at 
disarmament. Perhaps it was this new found security with the West 
that enabled Khrushchev to relax Soviet domination in the F.asl.
Of fundamental importance to the region was that Khrushchev 
not only spoke of "different roads to socialism." but actually backed 
these words up. In June of 1956. Tito visited the U.S.S.R., and there 
was a genuine attempt to reconcile the Kremlin's differences with 
him. In other states, national communist leaders, like Goinulka in 
Poland, were allowed to gain power. Thus, Khrushchev definitely 
loosened the reins on Kastcrn (Europe. As Hungary would show, 
though, loose reins did not mean no reins. F.ven during Khrushchev’s 
time, Moscow claimed the right to meddle in the region. This 
interference was not as exploitative as during Stalins time. 
Khrushchev attempted to allow the states in the region the right to 
pursue their different roads to socialism, but he still reserved 
Moscow's right to be the traffic-cop along these roads.
The Brezhnev Kra
Brezhnev differed from Khrushchev in a number of ways, 
Brezhnev never showed himself to be the risk laker that Khrushchev 
was. He immediately ended the sovnarkhozy reforms and felt 
satisfied with an economic structure basically unchanged since 
Stalin's time. He also, primarily before 1972, stressed the conflictual 
nature in the superpower relationship. Alexei Kosygin stated on June 
18, 1965, that "the government of the United States is in essence 
pursuing ... an aggressive foreign policy directed against the socialist
countries.'*44 To compensate for this, the Soviet Union embarked on a 
policy of achieving parity with the United States and drastically 
increased its defense spending. Edmonds states that Soviet defense 
and space expenditures increased five-fold between 1958 and 
1968.45 This new attitude in the Kremlin also affected Moscow's 
policy towards the WTO nations. It was necessary to demand more 
reliable regimes again in order to match Moscow's security 
perogatives.
Brezhnev would apply his own doctrine of limited sovereignty 
in August of 1968 to end the Prague Spring and the rule of 
Alexander Dubcek. Dubcek had begun to liberalize the economy and 
threatened to bring about political liberalization. The Prague Spring 
was directed from the party, and Dubcek had control. Unlike Nagy in 
Hungary in 1956, Dubcek never publicly threatened to leave the 
Warsaw Pact. "Socialism with a human face" was an internal 
development and did not directly concern the Soviet Union.
However, Brezhnev ordered Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops to 
enter Czechoslovakia on the night of August 20-21, 1968, for many 
of the same reasons that Stalin had for installing the empire twenty 
years before. This is exemplified by that, despite being over twenty 
years after the end of World War II, Brezhnev still lived with the 
memory of the Soviet war dead. Brezhnev would argue to Dubcek 
that the "Czech and Slovaks should therefore honor their graves, not 
defiU them /46 As Mlynar summed, Brezhnev's logic was simple:
44tconid Brezhnev, reprinted in Albert L. Weeks. The Other Side of
C acm icm c . p. 206.
45Edmonds, p. 41.
46Zdenck Mlynar, MiglUflOTI- in Prague p. 240.
We in the Kremlin came to the conclusion that we 
could not depend on you any longer. You do what 
you feel like in domestic politics, even things that 
displease us, and you are not open to positive 
suggestions. But your country lies on territory 
where the Soviet soldier trod in the Second World 
War. We bought that territory at the cost of 
enormous sacrifices, and we shall never leave it. The 
borders of that area arc our borders as well. Because 
you do not listen to us, we feel threatened. In the 
name of the dead in World War Two who laid down 
their lives for your freedom as well, we are therefore 
fully justified in sending our soldiers into your 
country, so that we may feel truly secure within our 
common borders. It is immaterial whether anyone is 
actually threatening us or not: it is a matter of 
principle, independent of external circumstances.
And that is how it will be, from the Second World 
War until eternity. 47
It is evident from this speech how deeply ingrained the memory of 
World War II was in Brezhnev. Also evident is the concept of Soviet 
security based on the possession of territory. Brezhnev made it very 
clear to Dubcek that Czech territory was also Soviet territory. Soviet 
action did not need any justification.
It is important to note that despite this nostalgic attitude there 
was debate amongst the Politburo members as to whether the 
invasion should have been carried out. Allegedly, Khrushchev, out of 
power and in disgrace, opposed the action. Ambartsumov claimed 
that Voronov, a Politburo member at the time of the invasion, voted 
against the action,48 although, Jiri Valenta states that Voronov’s vote
47Mlynar, p. 240.
48FBIS. August 16. 1989. p. 28.
was not accounted for.49 However, it is known that Piotr Shelest was 
a major advocate for Soviet and WTO action to end the Prague Spring.
This advocacy is insightful for the student of Soviet foreign 
policy because it reveals its domestic element. Shelest was for the 
use of force in Czechoslovakia because he feared the effects of the 
Prague Spring inside the Soviet Union. Shelest was the head of the 
Ukrainian Communist Party in 1968 and feared that the 
liberalization in Czechoslovakia might spread over into his republic.
As Rubinstein points out, the Czechs and Slovaks are regarded by the 
Ukrainians as nearest to them in culture and tradition.50 If the 
Czechs were allowed to liberalize, so the logic goes, then the 
Ukrainians would also demand liberalization, something Shelest 
would not consider. Therefore, Shelest became a hawk in order to 
halt any chance of liberalization in the Ukraine. Thus, the Soviets 
invoked the Brezhnev Doctrine in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in part, 
due to domestic considerations.
By 1968 every action had to be seen in the superpower 
context. Brezhnev made it clear to Dubcek that he could guarantee 
the United States' inaction to a Soviet invasion. The superpowers had 
their own spheres of influence and respected their adversaries' 
spheres. As Brezhnev would taunt Dubcek, "So what do you think 
will be done on your behalf? Nothing. There will be no war."51 In 
1965, the United States used troops in the Dominican Republic. The 
so-called Johnson Doctrine can be seen as an extension of U.S. rights
49Jiri Valcnta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia. 1968 ,p. 176 n. X3.
50Rubinstcin, p. 97.
51Mlynar, p. 241.
throughout the Western hemisphere. There was not the same 
ideological emphasis in both doctrines, but in essence the two were 
alike. They both seemed to state, "We are the great powers in the 
world, and we will protect our backyard from our adversaries, 
regardless of who really owns our backyard." Thus, the Brezhnev 
Doctrine can be seen as a response to the bipolar orientation of the 
post-war world.
Further Applications
It is true that through the i970s, the Brezhnev Doctrine was a 
policy towards Eastern Europe. On December 27, 1979. the Soviets 
occupied Kabul, Afghanistan. Staar argues that this showed that the 
Brezhnev Doctrine was being expanded to include "territorial 
neighbors."52 Afghanistan would become a nightmare to the Soviets 
and perhaps lead to a reevaluation of a policy of coercion, but in 
1979, it was a simple case of demanding non-threatening regimes on 
the borders of the Soviet Union. If force was required to achieve 
this, it was justified. After ten years of stalemate, Moscow was not 
as eager to use force.
Moscow would soon have to face a more serious threat. In 
Poland, economic conditions were worsening, as the strategy of 
borrowing Western credits had failed. Under the leadership of an 
electrician, Lech Walesa, Solidarity was formed. Solidarity 
represented an ideologically repugnant phenomenon--an 
independent labor union in a worker's state! By August 31, 19X1 
Edward Gierek was forced to resign. Since communism was never
5^Richard Staar. USSR Foreign Policies After Dcicnic. p. X.
accepted by the Poles, Solidarity represented a serious threat to 
communist rule. The Soviets would have to decide on how to act.
The Polish crisis of 1980-81 can be seen as another example of 
the implementation of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The doctrine was 
enforced, but it was not applied like the previous crises. First, the 
Soviet leadership did not directly use force, instead opting for the 
martial law of General Wojciech Jaruzelski, This might seem a 
departure from previous policy, but it really was only a difference in 
scope and method. The Soviets never felt that it would be wrong to 
intervene. Factors such as military strength and political 
ramifications were involved, but the Soviets made it clear that there 
would not be an emergence of an anti-Soviet regime in Warsaw.
The Soviets did threaten Poland. In July 1981, the CPSIJ 
claimed to be ‘disturbed by the fact that the offensive by 
antisocialist enemy forces in Poland threatens the interests of the 
entire commonwealth.’51 Thus, the Soviets still claimed that the 
interests of the commonwealth were more important than the 
interests of the individual state. Although the Soviets never 
intervened, Jiri Valenta described Soviet action as “indirect 
intervention."54 There were border movements, accusatory letters 
written to Stanislaw Kania and assistance given to Jaruzelski, 
specifically by Kulikov.55 Thus, on December 13, 1981, when 
Jaruzelski declared martial law and arrested key Solidarity leaders,
^Rubinstein, pp. 100-1.
54Jiri Valenta, ’’Revolutionary Change, Soviet Intervention, and
Normalization’ in East-Central Europe,” p. 133.
55 Ibid. p. 136.
(he Kremlin was satisfied. The commonwealth was secured, and the
Brezhnev Doctrine applied, albeit indirectly.
When Brezhnev died in 1982, he had just recently applied his 
namesake doctrine twice and was still waging war against Afghan 
rebels. By 1982, with Ronald Reagan in the White Mouse, Washington 
was now referring to the Soviet Union as the “evil empire,” and the 
Cold War was in its chilliest days, it was hard to imagine in 1982 
that Brezhnev was the same man who was in charge in the Kremlin 
during the days of detente.
Between the death of Brezhnev and the emergence of 
Gorbachev were the periods of Yuri Andropov and Konstantin 
Chernenko. While these leaders seemed to have different views, an 
in-depth look at their rule is ill-suited for our study due to the 
brevity of their tenure. Perhaps the best summary of their rules is 
that they made no apparent move to alter Soviet policy towards 
Eastern Europe. Thus, by the time Gorbachev took over, the 
Brezhnev Doctrine was still official policy.
Before going onward, it is important to see that the Brezhnev 
Doctrine itself was not a static policy. It was malleable and had 
undergone some change over the years. As stated before, the 
Brezhnev Doctrine had its origins in Stalinist times. Stalin ru th lessly  
exploited the region both politically and economically. Mis successors 
were forced to formulate a policy that would maintain the empire he 
created and yet facilitate the emergence of viable regimes. In 1956,
Hungary appeared ready to leave the fold and cause destabilization 
in the bloc. The Soviets acted swiftly and invaded Hungary within 
two weeks of the beginning of the crisis. On the face of it, the
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situation in Czechoslovakia in 1968 seemed less threatening than the 
previous one. In the end, the Soviets felt that the increased political 
liberalization could not be tolerated. The application of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine was not as swift in Czechoslovakia, though. It took the 
Kremlin seven to eight months to act and they decided not to act 
unilaterally, as was done in 1956, but rather with other members of 
the WTO. Finally, the last significant application of the doctrine was 
seen in Poland in 1980-81. The Soviets still proclaimed the right to 
intervene on the behalf of the commonwealth, but the final decision 
was made to rely on General Jaruzelski and not to take overt military 
action. That the decision was made well over a year into the crisis 
shows that, although the Brezhnev Doctrine was still the official 
policy, it might have been perceived as a less attractive one.
It is also important to note that the policy was not always 
applied everywhere. When Tito strayed from Stalin, the latter 
attempted to use economic coercion and expulsion from the 
Cominform to bring Tito back into the fold. Also, Albania was 
allowed to break away from the Warsaw Pact in the early 1960s.s<* 
Likewise, the maverick Ceausescu was allowed to formulate an 
increasingly independent policy. The primary reason for the 
selective application of the Brezhnev Doctrine was strategic. The 
doctrine was still enforced in the so-called "Northern tier" of the 
alliance. The "Southern tier" was allowed to partially gravitate from 
the Soviet Union, but essentially the Brezhiev Doctrine remained in 
force. S
SftFor a good study of the Albanian defection, consult William li. Griffith, 
Albania and the Sino-Sovict Rift.
Premature Analysis
In a book written in 1975, Robin Edmonds, basking in the glow 
of detente, prematurely declared the death of the Cold War. I do not 
wish to bring up Edmonds’s book simply to remark on his faulty 
logic. It is important to note that even while the Brezhnev Doctrine 
was still the cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy, some began to 
interpret a change. Edmonds was one of these people, and it is 
important to try to understand what prompted him to write about 
the death of the Cold War long before its actual occurrence,
Edmonds based his conclusion on several factors, the major one 
being the improved relationship between the Soviet Union and West 
Germany. On August 12, 1970, the U.S.S.R. signed the Treaty of 
Moscow with the Federal Republic of Germany. Edmonds stated, "It 
is hoped that the compromise enshrined in the Moscow Treaty of 
1970 will be found by later historians to mark the beginning of the 
end of the twentieth century European civil wars."57 This was 
incredibly naive. Although the arrangement alleviated tensions, it 
did not address the major needs of either state. Germany was still 
separated, symbolized by the Berlin Wall, and the Soviets, in need of 
Western capital, were still not going to be able to satisfy their 
insatiable appetite. The greatest reason that the Treaty of Moscow 
could not live up to Edmonds' lofty expectations was that it ignored 
the role played by the United States in European affairs. There could 
not be a "pax Europa" by bilateral arrangements made solely by 
European states. The United States had to be involved. That
57Edmonds, p. 95.
Edmonds ignored this is curious, but it explains why he was incorrect 
in his analysis of Soviet foreign policy.
Edmonds also cites the fact that Voronov and Shelest were 
removed from the Politburo in 1973 as a significant blow to the 
Brezhnev Doctrine, since Shelest was one of the strongest advocates 
for the use of force in Czechoslovakia in 1968. This ignores the fact 
that Voronov was not an advocate for the invasion, and 
Ambartsumov claims that Voronov was actually the sole dissenting 
vote in the decision to use force. Thus, Edmonds incorrectly analyzes 
the event and draws the conclusion that the Cold War was dead. This 
would prove to be premature.
Edmonds also took events at their face value. He quotes the 
WTO ministry and states that they believed in the ’renunciation of 
the use of force or the threat of the use of force in interstate 
relations in Europe.”58 The simple fact is that Brezhnev never meant 
to renounce this right. It is apparent in his unwillingness to
substantially reduce the level of ground troops in Europe and by his 
inclusion into the bilateral treaties between the allies guaranteeing 
the right of intervention to protect the commonwealth. The 
Preamble of the Czechoslovakia-U.S.S.R. agreement refers to the 
common international duty of socialist states. Thus, despite 
Edmonds' belief, the U.S.S.R. still claimed the right to intervene in the 
affairs of other European states.
58Edmonds, p. 96.
Eart.Three; Thg .Rationale.. Uom yds
By the time Mikhail Gorbachev would assume power in 1985* 
the rationale for the use of the Brezhnev Doctrine was already in 
decay. Eastern Europe was an economic liability with decreasing 
military utility for the Soviet Union. The Soviets were mired in 
Afghanistan* and the use of force was losing its attraction. A 
conversion in policy would be consistent with what the United States 
did when it invoked the Nixon Doctrine. Also* in the late 1980s there
was less emphasis on the socialist movement in the Third World. 
Thus* the effectiveness of Eastern Europe as a rule model was 
declining in importance. Finally, the Soviets had less use for Eastern 
European states as proxies, as the Soviets themselves would make 
arms deals with other states because the Soviets desperately needed 
hard currency. In sum, anyone who emerged in the Kremlin in 1985 
would have to seriously reconsider the utility of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine. This section will try to analyze the important factors that 
would lead to a reassessment of policy.
Economic Factors
Throughout this paper, the economic condition of the Soviet 
Union has been mentioned as an aside. l;or Stalin, Eastern Europe 
represented an area of exploitation that was well suited for aiding 
Soviet post-war recovery. Khrushchev exuded confidence in the 
socialist system and in his own innovative reforms, and therefore did 
not place much emphasis on the economic factors in Soviet-East 
European relations. By 1965* the Soviet economy was showing signs 
of slowing growth. Brezhnev reinstituted the Stalinist ministerial 
program that was previously altered by Khrushchev. The Soviets
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needed major reforms, but Brezhnev was not the man to implement 
them.
The Soviet economy in 1991 is a product of the history of the 
Soviet Union. It is a highly centralized economy where the stale sets 
prices and output targets. What has developed is an increasingly 
inefficient system in which a suppliers' market has emerged in the 
face of general scarcity.59 This has also contributed to the growth of 
a large shadow economy that has evaded state regulation. The lack 
of the system to promote innovation has occurred due to a manager's 
fear of planning from the "achieved level."60 This has contributed to 
lower and lower growth rates. By the time Gorbachev took over, the 
official Soviet estimate of the growth rate from 1981-85 was down to 
3.6 percent.61 Abel Aganbegyan estimated that there was no growth 
from 1980 to 1985.62 Whichever the estimate, the Soviet economy
« r
was in trouble. There was a social cost to be paid for this, also. The 
Soviets average life-expectancy was dropping, alcoholism was 
increasing, and the region was an ecological nightmare.
Indeed, today the Soviet economy is synonymous with 
inefficiency and collapse. It is easy to be cynical and view this 
collapse as an inevitable result of an inherently flawed system, but 
there was a time when confidence in the system seemed warranted. 
During the civil war the Bolsheviks instituted a harsh program which 
included forced requisitioning of foodstuffs from the countryside.
This period came to be known as War Communism, and the country
^Nikolai Shmelev, reprinted in Class Notes Economics 357, p. 235.
60lgor Birman, reprinted in Class Notes Economics 357, p. 99.
6 ,Aslund, p. 15.
6 2 lhid.
was in a stale of economic duress. One by one the Bolsheviks 
eventually defeated their White enemies and then consolidated their 
power. Next, they had to defeat the foreign powers who were 
intervening. For the most part, the Western powers simply left, but 
in the case of Poland, a war had to be waged. With the signing of the 
Treaty of Riga in 1921, the Bolsheviks had defeated their last major 
external threat. A bigger internal economic threat lie ahead to be 
solved by the Bolshevik leadership.
The rebellion at Kronshtadt was a signal to the leadership that 
the economic ills of the country had to be addressed. The Bolshevik 
leaders read Marx for answers (which were not there since he never 
wrote about the mechanisms of socialism), but it was Lenin who was 
prepared to answer his own question of What Is To Be Done? (1902). 
Despite the objections of many hard line Bolsheviks, Lenin would 
institute a New Lcononiic Policy.
The New Economic Policy was a temporary compromise in 
order to let the country recover from the Civil War and the 
revolution that preceded it. It replaced forced grain requisitioning 
with a tax in kind, and the terms of trade were altered to the benefit 
of the countryside. Private property and enterprises were allowed to 
exist and the economic state of the country vastly improved. By 
1926, the Soviet Union had completely recovered from its wartime 
dislocations, as the following table illustrates:
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Production indexes (1913 = 100)
Y e a r I n d u s t r y A g r i c u l t u r e T r a n s p o r t a t i o n
1 9 1 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 9 2 0 2 0 6 4 2 2
1 9 2 8 1 0 2 1 1 8 106*5
Not everyone was pleased, though, indeed many claimed that the 
Soviet Union had become a radish - Mred on the outside and white on 
the inside.”
Lenin became ill and eventually died in 1924. There was a 
fierce power struggle for his position. It is unimportant to describe 
the process in which Stalin allied himself with the Left and then with 
the Right. It is important that some of the major arguments centered 
on economic activity. Bukharin was a proponent of NLP and 
advocated socialism at ”a snail’s pace.” Stalin was evasive on this 
issue, often changing depending on who he was allied with at the 
time. When Stalin had firm control by 1928, it became clear that he 
had no plan of continuing the NEP.
In 1928, Stalin put an end to the NEP. Collectivization was 
brutally carried out, and virtually all enterprises were nationalized. 
Stalin brutally coerced many and in 1931 told his country that if its 
economic backwardness was not made up in ten years, she would 
suffer a terrible fate. Thus, as the world suffered through the Great 
Depression, the Soviets posted impressive growth rates. Stalin 
squeezed his population, urging them on to Stakhanovite efforts.
^R obert Gurley, reprinted in Class Notes Economies 357, p. 82.
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Despite suffering through the purges of 1934-1938, the Soviets 
emerged ready to meet the German challenge in 1941.
Thus, the story up to now is not one of economic ineptitude.
The Soviet Union never experienced the Great Depression and rapidly 
industrialized in order to prepare for the Second World War. It 
would emerge from this war as one of the world’s superpowers and 
as the dominant power on the continent. There was a price to pay 
for this privileged position, though. The social costs were enormous. 
Millions died in purges, famines and collectivization. Twenty-two 
million Soviets lay dead, and the country was exposed to massive 
German misdeeds during the Second World War. The Soviet Union 
was a superpower, indeed, hut one which needed to lick its wounds.
Stalin here realized that Eastern Europe could he vital. As 
stated before, the Soviet Union ruthlessly exploited the region in 
order to facilitate a swifter Soviet recovery. This exploitation would 
persist until the death of Stalin in 1953.
The post-Stalin leadership inherited an economic system that 
was suited for extensive growth, or growth by utilizing a greater 
amount of internal inputs. By the time the 1960s emerged, it 
became apparent that this would no longer be possible. For the 
Soviet Union to continue to grow successfully, it would have to 
undergo intensive growth, which involved more efficiently utilizing 
the inputs that it already possessed. A new factor emerged in 
economic growth - technology. The new modern economies would 
have to possess state-of-the-art technologic* in order to be 
competitive in the global market. The Stalinist economic system.
with its highly centralized apparatus headed by Gosplan, was ill- 
suited for this.
Khrushchev realized that the Soviet economy had to be altered. 
He also realized that the Soviet economic exploitation in East Europe 
could not continue forever. So, Khrushchev implemented the 
sovnarkhozy reforms while easing the terms of trade with Eastern 
Europe. The result was that the Soviet Union actually began to 
subsidize Eastern Europe, rather than exploit her. This drain on the 
Soviet economy was viewed to be insignificant because Khrushchev 
was confident of his nation’s future.
One must view the Brezhnev era as an era of stagnation. The 
so-called Kosygin reforms of 1965, and the price reforms that 
followed, never essentially alleviated the major flaws of the Soviet 
economy. Brezhnev did begin to realize that it was essential for the 
bloc to coordinate its trade activity. In 1973, he instituted a program 
in CMEA which called for increased specialization between the 
socialist economies. This program met with stiff resistance from 
many CMEA members, especially Ceausescu’s Romania. Romania felt 
that the specialization program would guarantee that Romania would 
remain underdeveloped, while her natural resources would be 
exploited to the benefit of the other more advanced states in the 
alliance.
The Soviet response to this challenge was one of compromise. 
While still advocating the program, Moscow would eventually alter 
the voting rules in CMEA so that non-unanimity was no longer 
required. Thus, states could participate in the programs they wanted 
to. Although this compromise was politically feasible, it meant that
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the economic integration would never be a reality and the bloc would 
never significantly help the Soviet economy.
It is clear that when Yuri Andropov took over after the death
of Brezhnev, the economy would be given utmost priority.
Andropov's reign was too short to determine his precise path, but 
evidently he felt that through a campaign to improve workers' 
productivity and pride, the Soviet economy could be revitalized. The 
cornerstone of this policy would be his anti-alcohol campaign.
Although initially successful, it is unlikely that Andropov would have 
been able to revive the Soviet economy much further by only 
addressing the symptoms and not the disease of the Soviet economy.
Like Andropov s short rule, it is also difficult to ascertain what long­
term decisions would have been made by the ill-fated Chernenko.
On March 11, 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev ascended to power in 
the Kremlin. Gorbachev also felt that the economy must be 
revitalized in order for his country to remain a superpower in the 
next century. To date, Gorbachev has failed to improve the Soviet 
economy, but through his xlasnosh most Soviet citizens now realize 
how much poorer they are in comparison to the West. The economy 
became a national priority, almost an obsession. Other policies could 
be negotiable, but the improvement of the Soviet economy had to be 
forthcoming. As Gorbachev would state, "perestroika is our last 
chance. '04 It is in this context that one must evaluate Soviet foreign
policy.
04Brzczinski, p. 66.
By the 1980s, economic activity between the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe had developed into a symbiotic relationship. The 
Soviets provided cheap resources, most important of which was 
energy, and Eastern Europe provided the Soviets with manufactured 
goods. Initially, this would appear to be an advantageous situation 
for both parties. However, when experts began to analyze the 
relationship, it became clear that the Soviets were heavily 
subsidizing the Eastern European economies.
The first major scholarly work done on this relationship was 
done by Marrese and Vanous.65 They argued that the price that the 
Soviets were receiving for the energy they provided Eastern Europe 
was well below the world market price. There existed an implicit 
subsidy because the Soviets were accepting poor quality goods and 
could purchase the same goods from better sources in the West. 
Also, the goods that the Soviets purchased were well above market 
price. The overall subsidies from the Soviet Union for the period of 
1971*1980 was estimated at $80 billion.66 Paul Marer feels this 
number to be "greatly overstated."67 Marer estimates the total 
Soviet subsidy to the region to be $14 billion from 1971 - I978.68 
The academic argument is irrelevant. The important fact is that 
Eastern Europe had become a drain on the Soviet economy, and 
Soviet leaders could read documented reports stating such. 
Gorbachev made it clear that such a relationship would no longer be 
acceptable to Moscow. Indeed, by 1988, in order to bolster the
65Gati, p. 119.
66Paul Marer, reprinted in Terry, p. 174.
67Ibid.
68Ibid.
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Soviet economy, the Soviets ran a 1.286 trillion ruble trade deficit 
with the rest of the East bloc.69
To Marer, the subsidy was a reality that most Soviet leaders 
would have to accept for political reasons. Marer was "quite certain 
that no Soviet leadership will want to give up the ideological, 
military, political, and economic alliance system it dominates in the 
region."70 What Marer failed to realize was that these other 
advantages were intrinsically linked to Soviet economic success.
What military advantages could Eastern Europe give to the Soviets, if 
the Soviet economy collapsed and was not able to support her own 
military complex? Also, what ideological advantages could be 
accrued to a bankrupt Soviet Union? The U.S.S.R. could no longer 
claim to have the answer to capitalism if socialism was proving itself 
a failure. Thus, Marer was wrong when he underestimated the 
importance of economics. If a Soviet leader felt the Soviet subsidy to 
be too much, he might not invoke the Brezhnev Doctrine to enforce 
the status quo. Thus, the poor performance of the socialist economies 
had a direct influence on the disuse of the Brezhnev Doctrine. 
Gorbachev's emphasis of the Soviet economy made the influence of 
economic matters even more important.
The M ilitary Factor
One of the primary reasons that the Soviets still clung to 
Eastern Europe and applied the Brezhnev Doctrine was due to the 
perceived military advantages that accrued from such an 
arrangement. These advantages were not automatic. Just because a
69Lydolph, p. 415.
70Marcr, reprinted in Terry, p. 186.
bloc of states possess a similar political infrastructure does not 
guarantee that they will be able to join together and cooperate 
effectively in military matters. As stated before, once Stalin had 
incorporated the empire it was up to his predecessors to manage it. 
This meant that an alliance system should have been developed to 
enhance the security of the Soviet Union.
It is apparent from Brezhnev's patriotic quote to Dubcek (see 
above) that the Soviets considered the borders of its allies as the 
Soviet Union’s own borders. Any NATO attack would be met, not on 
Soviet territory, but on German and Polish territory. The area could 
be seen as a buffer zone for the protection of the U.S.S.R. 
Geographically, the assets of the bloc were obvious. In the 1980s, 
this asset seemed less important. More and more, Soviet security 
was no longer being equated with land, but with military technology. 
Thus, the perceived geographic advantages gained by the Soviets 
were less important in 1980 than in 1950.
Geographic factors are only part of the equation. For Soviet 
security to be truly enhanced, Eastern European troops would have 
to be reliable. If they were not willing to cooperate with the Soviets 
or to fight an enemy than there could be no positive influence on 
Soviet security. Thus, any Soviet leader had to analyze the reliability 
of the troops in the bloc and not naively assume that they would 
automatically follow the Soviet lead.
This was not a new phenomenon. In October 1956, there was 
strife in both Poland and Hungary. The conventional logic in 
explaining Soviet reaction to both situations is to claim that in Poland 
the party remained in control, whereas in Hungary they did not.
Thus, the Soviets were forced to act in Hungary. Imre Nagy's 
declaration of his intent to leave the WTO also facilitated Soviet 
action in Hungary. There was another reason for action in Hungary 
and not in Poland. In Hungary, the resistance that was anticipated 
was assumed to be negligible, whereas in Poland, it might be stiff. 
Khrushchev commented, “As we began to analyze the problem in 
more detail and calculate which Polish regiments we could count on 
to obey, ... the situation began to look somewhat bleak. Of course our 
arms strength fur exceeded that of Poland, but we didn't want to 
resort to the use of our own troops if at all avoidable."71 Thus, in 
1956 the Soviets were influenced by the potential unreliability of 
their allies' troops.
Stalin once joked about the influence of the Pope by referring 
to the lack of divisions he controlled, but one is no more powerful 
with the possession of unreliable divisions. The soldiers in lias) 
European armies were a cross-section of their societies, l ike the 
masses in the mid-1980s, “East European soldiers lack|ed| 
commitment to communist party values and Soviet interests."72 This 
is very important. It called into question the perceived benefits of 
the alliance. As Gati slates, "Given the relatively poor performance of 
the East European armies both at home and in the region over the 
years, is there any reason to believe that they would perform better 
against NATO?"73 If the answer was no, then one of the rationales
71Jiri Valcnta "Revolutionary Change. Soviet Intervention, and
'Normalization' in East-Central Europe," p. 133.
72a Ross Johnson, reprinted in Terry, p. 275.
73Cati, p. 150.
for the continued application of the Brezhnev Doctrine was no longer 
valid.
The Soviets had recognized the need for the creation of 
mechanisms in order to insure the reliability of Eastern European 
troops. V'olyges states that the effort has been "to ensure that the 
East European armed forces will enhance Soviet interests."74 The 
first step the Soviets took was to institutionalize the alliance by 
creating the Warsaw Pact, or the WTO. This organization was to be 
the military alliance for the East bloc in order to protect themselves 
from the threat posed by NATO. At first the Pact was not significant; 
it was "little more than a symbolic instrument."7S An effort to make 
it a more meaningful alliance was made in the l%Os. The Soviets 
obviously wished to have the most influence in the organization. 
Russian was made the WTO's official language, Soviet "advisors" were 
sent to allied countries and many East European officers were invited 
to study in the U.S.S.R. Just as economic integration ran into 
resistance, so did military coordination. There seemed to be a 
conflict between the establishment of national armies and the 
international purpose of the alliance. These "national animosities, 
resentment against Soviet-imposed policies, and the constant 
primacy of Soviet national interests made the Pact an outmoded and 
not very meaningful instrument."76
V'olyges argues that this did not necessarily mean that these 
countries did not aid the Soviet Union militarily. On the contrary, he
74Ivan V'olyges, "The Warsaw Pact." p. 551.
75lbid. p. 552.
76lbid. p. 556.
argued that while the WTO was a charade and an unreliable 
organization, the East European armies were essentially under the 
direct control of the Soviet Union. To back this claim V’olgyes cites 
the publication in a Polish journal of a statement made by Ryszard 
Kuklinski. This article claimed that all WTO members, except 
Romania, agreed that in the case of war, the Soviets could control 
most of their own national troops. Thus, V'olgyes concludes, "By the 
1980s the fighting forces of the national armies, for all essential 
purposes, have become permanent assets of the Soviet army."77 
While this conclusion does not appear to have further supporting 
evidence, V’olyges is right in asserting that the WTO was a charade. 
Whether these countries actually contributed to the security of the 
U.S.S.R. was up to the experts to decide.
There was reason to question the value of the allied 
contribution to Soviet security. First, the perception of the enemy by 
the mid-1980s was changing. In the past, the Soviets could claim 
that there was a West German threat, but now this plea was not us 
compelling. Also, Soviet domination of the WTO caused resentment. 
Indeed, Romania refused to allow WTO maneuvers on its soil and 
demanded an improved voting scheme. The East bloc countries were 
correct in detecting a political element in Soviet planning. Out of 
fifty troop practices in the late 1970s, only nine were conducted in 
the so-called Southern tier, which is deemed less important for 
Soviet security.78 Political nepotism could also be detected in the
77 V’olyges, p. 566.
78Johnson, reprinted in Terry, p. 270.
distribution of armaments. All of this caused friction in the alliance 
and called into question its reliability.
in discussing Soviet security concerns and the use of the 
military, it is not enough to discuss defense capabilities because 
there are other reasons for Soviet troop deployment. First. Soviet 
troops are seen as as a deterrent against Western aggression. Thus, 
it is not sufficient to merely address their reliability in combat, if the 
security system prevents combat in the first place. Also, the Soviets 
have kept troops in the region to show a degree of commitment to 
their allies. In some states, the Red Army was the final guarantor of 
stability, and without its presence, many local regimes would be 
destabilized. Thus, when one assesses the military advantages 
accrued to Moscow, one must be sure to include these psychological 
effects as well. However, if it were deemed that militarily the 
Soviets were not receiving the security they desired, then other 
policies would be pursued.
Ideological considerations 
Another factor that might inhibit Soviet invocation of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine was that there was no longer the aura of an 
ideological monolithic consensus. How could the Soviets determine 
what reforms were allowed, when the U.S.S.R. was reforming? In 
1987, Gennadi Gerasimov was in Prague and was asked what was the 
difference between Dubcek and Gorbachev. Gerasimov simply joked, 
"Nineteen years.”79 The Soviet attitude towards reform had changed. 
It seemed that the Soviets were less likely to intervene in another
79Br/.czinski, p. 134,
state simply because another had attempted reforms. It seemed less 
likely that the events of 1968 could be repeated with an ideological 
justification.
S u p erp o w er A nalogies
A factor always apparent in the invoking of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine had been the anticipated reaction from the United States.
The Soviets were confident that the United States would be too 
preoccupied in the Suez crisis in October 1956 to seriously protest 
Soviet action in Hungary. Likewise, the United States was bogged 
down in the jungles of Vietnam during the Czechoslovak crisis in 
1968. Thus, when the United States was preoccupied, the Soviets 
were more willing to invoke the doctrine. All of the decisions made 
by the Soviets to intervene in region or not must be seen in the 
superpower context.
There is a precedent for disuse in American foreign policy. The 
United States advocated an interventionist foreign policy during the 
Johnson years which led to an increased involvement in Vietnam. 
Afterwards, Johnson's successor, Richard Nixon formulated his own 
policy, the Nixon Doctrine. The Nixon Doctrine stated that the United 
States would no longer police the world. After Vietnam, the United 
States was not ready to intervene everywhere. The Brezhnev policy, 
too, led to an unpopular and ineffective war in Afghanistan in the 
1980s. Perhaps, the Soviets, reacting analogously with the United 
States, felt less compelled to implement a doctrine which called for 
military action.
The Germ an Factor
In an analysis of Soviet foreign policy towards Bast Europe, one 
must mention the importance placed on Germany. After the Second 
World War, the emasculation of German power was an essential 
Soviet goal. As the Western powers united and formed the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Stalin consolidated his control in the eastern 
half of the state. Although there were some token initiatives to unite 
the two, Stalin would cause disruptions in West Berlin in 1948 in an 
attempt to receive recognition for the socialist section of Germany. 
The Federal Republic responded by developing the Ilallenstein 
Doctrine in 1935 which stated that the Federal Republic would refuse 
to recognize any state which recognized the German Democratic 
Republic. It was always the Soviet Union's goal to defeat this policy 
and make the West accept the reality of two Germanics. Brezhnev 
would triumphantly declare, "The so-called Hallenstein doctrine has 
been defeated. The GDR has already been recognized by 27 states, 
and this process is bound to continue."80 Meanwhile, hostility 
towards the FRG was the norm. In the Czech events of 1968, West 
Germany was singled out for its aggressive behavior and imperialist 
goals.
Berlin was the true symbol of the cold war. No two events 
better showed the true antagonistic, and at times surreal, 
relationship between East and West than the Berlin Airlift of 1948 
and the erection of the Berlin Wall by Ulbricht in 1961. However, 
many argued that Poland was the most important ally for the
*°Brc/.hncv, p. 84.
U.S.S.R.81 This argument, though, was often made by implying the 
overwhelming importance of the GDR. Poland’s importance lay in the 
fact that it geographically separated the GDR from the U.S.S.R. In 
order for the U.S.S.R, to protect East Germany, Poland must be 
reliable. The overwhelming importance placed on the German issue 
began to wane, first during detente and then in the 1980s, as Soviet 
policy turned from pure antagonism toward the ERG to solicited 
assistance. This change of attitude was for two reasons.
First, the Soviets realized that they needed Western credits to 
help their economy. Gorbachev would further realize that capital 
would not be enough and that Western technology must also be 
placed at a premium. West Germany had dramatically improved its 
economic position in the world by I960 and was an obvious source 
for the Soviets.
In order to work with the Germans, the Soviets would have to 
lessen the rhetoric concerning the danger of West German 
revanchism. By the mid-1980s, the Soviets had done an about-face. 
Instead of using Germany as an example of Western aggression and 
imperialism, the Soviets began to see a rapprochement with Bonn as 
a way to weaken the NATO alliance. Since factions in Bonn differed 
from Washington on nuclear policy, the Soviets courted West 
Germany in order to weaken the entire alliance. Gorbachev began to 
conduct a "general peace offensive considered more likely both to 
exploit fissures in the alliance for their own sake and to bring 8
8 * Roger Kanct, class notes 10/13/88.
indirect pressure to bear on the United States.”82 To do this, the 
Soviets had to accept that Germany was no longer a principal threat 
to the Soviet Union. Thus, any new policy that involved the East bloc 
had to be taken in this context. Regardless of this stance, most 
assumed that the maintenance of the GDR was non-negotiable. In an 
article by Mark Kramer that recognized that the "Brezhnev doctrine 
... has largely dissipated," Kramer still concluded that "...the loss of 
East Germany might well be deemed intolerable."83 The fact that 
Germany would eventually be allowed to reunify and remain in the 
NATO alliance showed that the Soviets were willing to consider 
anything. This symbolized the new conception of Germany. Without 
this view, the Brezhnev Doctrine may never have been revoked.
82Harry Gclman, Gorbachevs Policies Towards Western Europe: A Balance 
Sheet, p. v.
83Mark Kramer, "Beyond the Brezhnev Doctrine," pp. 27 and 64.
Pan Four; Tbs Policy in Disuse
The Early Gorbachev Years • The Reinforcement of Policy
'Absolute systems are strong as long as they are absolute. When 
they begin to reform they are lost. Yet they cannot avoid reform, or 
they will explode.’’
--- Alexis de Toqueville
When Mikhail Gorbachev took over on March II, 1985, the 
Brezhnev Doctrine was the norm in foreign policy towards Eastern 
Europe. Its rationales were unraveling, though, and any leader 
would have had to reconsider seriously the advantages of the policy. 
Gorbachev was no normal leader, and his vision of the Soviet Union 
in the future did not include the Brezhnev Doctrine. This was not 
always apparent, though. Before analyzing Gorbachev’s motives, it is 
important to give a history of the process of the disuse of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine.
Perhaps the most important aspect in analyzing Gorbachev’s 
decision not to invoke the Brezhnev Doctrine was that it was not an 
inevitable occurrence. It is true that the reasons for the policy were 
indeed eroding, but a lesser man might not have altered policy. It is 
also important to note that many experts were caught by surprise 
when Gorbachev watched quietly while the empire unravelled.
Many a career was tarnished by confident proclamations stating that 
Gorbachev would invoke the doctrine if tested.
One such expert was Richard Staar. Staar analyzed the first 
two years of the Gorbachev period and concluded that the Brezhnev 
Doctrine was still intact. While Staar's major prettttse that Soviet
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foreign policy is "still guided by dogma" is flawed, he cites many 
factors to support his final conclusion.84 Although even Staar could 
sense that, "The winds of change seem evident,"85 he felt that these 
changes would not be fundamental and that Gorbachev would use 
the Brezhnev Doctrine to maintain the empire "at any cost."86
In Gorbachev's initial speech as Soviet leader, he claimed his 
"first priority" to be "to protect and strengthen in all ways the 
fraternal friendship with our closest comrades-in-arms and allies, 
the great socialist commonwealth."87 Thus, Gorbachev made it clear 
that the socialist commonwealth was still an important Soviet 
concept. In June, there appeared an article in Pravila that occupied 
the exact location in the newspaper that Kovalev's article occupied in 
1968. The article referred to Soviet willingness to "defend socialist 
gains and firmly uphold the interests of world socialism." The article 
further underscored the "common responsibility of all socialist 
countries."88 Thus, in 1985, the rhetoric of the Brezhnev Doctrine
rang true.
in 1986, there was hardly any indication that this would 
change. An article published in Pravda in 1986 contained 
statements that were similar to any in Brezhnev's day. The
commonwealth was stressed. as was every state's obligation to it.84
Thus, it appeared that the Brezhnev Doctrine was still going to be
84Siaar, p. xxi.
86lbid. p. 172.
87f ra u la , March 12, I‘>85, p. 3.
88/>ruv(/u. June 21. IM85 translated by Kramer, p. 28.
8yPravda, July I. I*>86. p. 4.
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applied. In fact, the doctrine seemed to be in force well into 
Gorbachev’s reign. In an excellent article about the doctrine, Mark 
Kramer considers 1988 to be a pivotal year.90 Before this, there is 
ample evidence of a continuation in Soviet foreign policy.
To further illustrate his point on Soviet continuity of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine, Staar cites the ’’periodic renewals of the threat of 
brute force. ’91 Unfortunately, he fails to cite any specific examples.
In another instance, he refers to the increasing intolerance of the 
media by Hungarian authorities. Mere he cites the example of the 
arrest of the editor of the Moz#o Vila# for holding deviant views. 
While this arrest seemed to run counter to #lasnost% its occurrence 
should not have been blown out of proportion as Staar proceeded to 
do. In hindsight, the incident could have been an example of 
Gorbachev’s unwillingness to intervene (positively or negatively) in 
the region. Staar mentions the Soviet removal of all seven 
ambassadors in the region. While he assumed this shake-up meant a 
return to Stalinist Soviet control, it appears to have had the opposite 
effect. Indeed, The Economist noted on April 17, 1987, that 
Gorbachev would try to use any methods to influence the leadership 
of the East bloc towards reform.92 Perhaps this ambassadorial 
shake-up was an example. Thus, Staar seemed to have been used to 
viewing Soviet leaders with suspicion, and any change would be 
viewed by him accordingly. His outlook greatly affected his 
conclusions.
90Kramer, p. 35.
91 Ibid. p. 170.
92Thc Economist. April 18, 1987. p. 12-13.
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Staar was not the only expert who predicted the application of 
the Brezhnev Doctrine. As late as March 6, 1989, William Safire 
emphatically claimed so. Despite many signals to the contrary by 
1989, Saffire claimed that Alexander Yakovlev "has made it clear 
that the Brezhnev doctrine remains in force."93 Safire then proudly 
claimed that if and when strife broke out in Eastern Europe, "depend 
on Mr. Gorbachev to crack down as Mr. Stalin would have, fraternally 
rolling in the tanks and shooting the dissenters."94 Indeed, Mr.
Saffire is probably not very proud of his brash conclusion, but it 
showed how many experts underestimated Gorbachev. They felt 
that under all the outward appeals to the Western media was a 
Stalin; they were wrong.
Until 1987, the actions taken by Gorbachev did not necessarily 
spell the death of the Brezhnev Doctrine. That Saffire would make 
such an observation in 1989 showed that he ignored some important 
developments in Soviet policy. Saffire, like other experts, seemed to 
assume that when trouble occurred, the Brezhnev Doctrine would be 
automatically invoked. This attitude ignored reality. Gorbachev's 
personal views and many solid reasons in favor of disutility of the 
policy would force a reevaluation.
The Gorbachev Years II • The Demise of the Doctrine
i think that the situation in the world is such that it differs 
fundamentally from what it was 30 or 40 years ago, not to mention, 
say, 50 or 70 years ago. The empires are gone, they are no more.
--- Mikhail Gorbachev
93William Satire. The New York Times, p. A17. 
94 Ibid.
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In 1987 there were some signs of a change in the Kremlin. 
Gorbachev wrote his own book Perestroika. Although by no means a 
complete renunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, the book contained 
the concept of a "common European home."95 In this new order, 
force would not be necessary. Indeed, Perestroika's new thinking 
meant that security could no longer be assured by military means. 
Many experts saw Gorbachev's new proposals as too idealistic or as a 
simple political ploy, and many ignored them altogether. There were 
reasons to sense a change, though. The appointment of Alexander 
Yakovlev, a staunch Gorbachev ally and reform advocate, to the 
position of the newly created CPSU commission on International 
Policy could be viewed as an attempt to lessen tensions. Also, Vadim 
Medvedev's appointment as the Central Committee secretary 
responsible for intra-bloc relations can be seen as an institutional 
change for the benefit of loosening relations within the bloc. 
Medvedev's reputation as a "reformist political economist" would 
bode well for future relations.96
No More .TIM F orce."
Pravda declared on April 11, 1987, that "no one has the right to 
claim special status in the socialist world."97 This was the first step 
in dismantling the Brezhnev Doctrine because it admitted that 
ideologically the Soviet Union should no longer be considered the 
"chief force." Thus, if socialism was endangered, all the socialist 
states, not simply the Soviet Union, would have to act. The days of
95Mikhail Gorbachev, gm ulfCtAfl. P 189.
96Aslund, p. 36.
97Pravda, April II, 1987, p. 2.
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unilateral intervention seemed to be over. By the beginning of 
1988, few felt that the Brezhnev Doctrine was dead, but the 
conventional wisdom was that the tolerance level of the Kremlin was 
"no longer clear as it once was."98 This was due, in part because the 
rhetoric from the Kremlin began to shift from arrogant superiority to 
interested onlooker. Indeed, if the Soviets were to reform their own 
state, it would be beneficial to observe the results of similar reforms 
in the Eastern European states. The Kremlin knew that, if allowed, 
the pace of reform in some states would outstrip those in Moscow. 
The Soviets had a vested interest in the success of these reforms. It 
was assumed that the alliance could remain intact - an economically 
healthier alliance is a better alliance. Thus, the Soviets allowed some 
of its allies more room to maneuver.
This phenomenon was far from a renunciation of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine. It merely stated that the Soviets would not attempt to be 
the sole proponents of socialist community. This was not that large 
of a development since the Soviets always knew that the regimes in 
Czechoslovakia and in East Germany would advocate a similar line 
with the Soviet Union with regard to maintaining bloc stability. It 
was good politics to reward these allies with greater political 
responsibility. Although the renunciation of the Soviet Union as the 
primary state in socialism can have other explanations, throughout 
1987, 1988 and 1989, one could find evidence that the Brezhnev 
Doctrine was about to fall into disuse.
98Bill Keller, The New York Times. 1/3/88. p. I.
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Gorbachev made it clear that he was determined to alter many 
things in the Soviet Union. Many experts debated the effects this 
would have on foreign policy. Some argued foreign policy would not 
be altered at all. Gorbachev wanted to convince the West that 
perestroika was in their interests. To do this, Gorbachev often would 
link internal changes to changes in foreign policy:
You have come to the Soviet Union at a time when 
basically revolutionary changes are taking place 
here. These changes are of immense significance for 
our society, for socialism as a whole, and for the 
entire world. It is only by understanding the 
content, meaning and aims of these changes that one 
can form a correct opinion about our foreign policy."
In other words, Gorbachev implored Western statesmen to throw
away their preconceived notions of Soviet intentions. The Soviet
Union in the era of "new thinking" was a different country whose
"Foreign policy is today to a greater extent than ever before
determined by domestic policy, by our interest in concentrating our
efforts on constructive activities aimed at improving our country.
And that is why we need a lasting peace...."10” Gorbachev admitted
in no uncertain terms that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union
would have to be altered to facilitate the domestic recovery. What
this meant exactly at the time was not clear, but certainly many
policies, including the Brezhnev Doctrine, would have to be
reevaluated. *10
"M ikhail Gorbachev, Speech before the International Forum for a Nuclear- 
Free World. Moscow 2/16/87, reprinted in At the Summit, p. 7.
100lbid.
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Gorbachev would prove to be serious about changing Soviet 
policy on nuclear issues. The INF treaty was signed, and at 
Reykjavik, Gorbachev and Reagan (much to the chagrin of his 
advisors) even discussed the elimination of all nuclear weapons. 
Gorbachev would continue to discuss this fact with the press. 
Gorbachev stated later, "At the meeting with President Reagan in 
Reykjavik we came close to understanding the desirability and 
possibility of complete nuclear disarmament.M,(n Gorbachev would 
use statements like these to obtain extreme popularity in the West. 
Gorbachev became well liked. Simply put, Gorbachev was a public 
relations agent’s dream. Mis views on peace and disarmament would 
enable him to win awards like Time's Man of the Year and the Nobel 
Peace Prize.
More important than the link between Gorbachev's views on 
disarmament and his own personal popularity in the West were the 
effects of his disarmament policy on the East bloc. Gorbachev 
himself linked the two. Gorbachev stated, "The elimination of 
nuclear weapons would also be a major step towards a genuine 
democratization of relations between states, towards establishing 
their equality and their equal responsibility."102 Further illustrating 
his point, Gorbachev stated, "Any attempts, direct or indirect, to 
influence the development of other than one s own country, to 
interfere in such development, should be ruled out."10* These words 
in full support of individual national sovereignty contrast with the
,0J Mikhail Gorbachev, "Realities and Guarantees Tor a Secure World.”
reprinted in Al..Ihc,.Summit, p. 26.
I02lbid, p. 30 
10*lbid.
Brezhnev Doctrine's view of limited sovereignty. There was no 
special mention of the East blot * of "socialist internationalism." In 
rhetoric, this was a theme often addressed by Gorbachev. Another 
rhetorical argument that marked a break with the past was 
Gorbachev’s statements that countries ’’...need mutual understanding 
And I believe that we must display greater respect for each other, 
try and understand the history of our nations better.”104
Gorbachev began to show his decreasing support for the 
Brezhnev Doctrine, not just with words, but with actions. On 
December 8, 1988, Gorbachev announced at the United Nations that 
the Soviet Union would unilaterally reduce the amount of troops 
deployed in the region. The drama of the event was obvious. 
Gorbachev, now perhaps, attained the pinnacle of his popularity in 
the West. Granted, there were genuine security and domestic 
reasons for Gorbachev’s actions. Lessening tensions in Europe would 
allow the Soviets to concentrate on their economic recovery.
Charles Gati drew two conclusions from Gorbachev's actions. 
One was that the Soviets no longer had imperialist aspirations. This
was a debatable point since Gorbachev's actions could be viewed as a
temporary retrenchment, buying time for the Soviet state. However, 
his second conclusion is more relevant. One of the primary reasons 
for Soviet troop deployments was symbolic. The Red Army 
represented a degree of Soviet commitment to its allies. By 
removing some of these troops, Gorbachev was clearly telling his
104Mikhail Gorbachev, Interview with NBC on 12/2/87. reprinted in At the 
Summit, p. 79.
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allies that the Soviet Union would no longer protect unpopular 
regimes from their own populations.'05
One such regime was the one in Czechoslovakia that was 
installed by the Soviets while invoking the Brezhnev Doctrine in 
1968. In fact, Gati called the governments of Czechoslovakia, Bast 
Germany, Romania and Bulgaria the "gang of four" because they 
resisted following Gorbachev's lead in liberalization. Eric Honcckcr 
led the resistance by commending the Soviet Union for reform, but 
quickly commented, "We intend to continue the previously proven 
way."105 06 The Economist reported, "In both Czechoslovakia and Bast 
Germany there is growing evidence of deep misgivings about the 
Gorbachev phenomenon."107 This defiance was not well received in 
Moscow. Gorbachev's defense cuts seemed to be specifically aimed at 
these countries. From Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the GDR, 5,(K)() 
out of 10,000 tanks were to be removed.1011 Thus, the policy can be 
seen as a blow to the Brezhnev Doctrine because Soviet commitment 
to these states was apparently waning. It is ironic, though, that the 
"gang of four" basically was betting on Gorbachev to invoke the 
Brezhnev Doctrine to protect their regimes if and when violence 
broke out. It was a bet that Honecker, Ceausescu, Zhivkov and llusak 
all would lose.
A strong indication that Gorbachev was going to tolerate more 
liberalization than his predecessors was revealed by the Soviet
105Oati, p. 161.
106John Tagliabuc, The New York Times. 7/1/89. p. 6.
107thc Economist. 2/21/87, p. 51.
1011Kcllcr, New York Times. 12/8/88. p.l.
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willingness to allow Hungary to reevaluate its history. The 
Hungarians were eager to declare that the Soviet invasion of Hungary 
in 1956 was illegal and unjust. Brezhnev would have never 
considered such a reappraisement. Gorbachev never indicated his 
opposition. Karoly Grosz, the general-secretary of the Hungarian 
Communist Party, visited Gorbachev in Moscow on March 23-24,
1989. After these talks, Hungarian Party press secretary Laszlo 
Major announced that the Soviets had agreed to make available
Soviet documents on the invasion so that Hungarian historians could 
reappraise the past.
The congeniality between the two states was not simply linked 
to historical research. Major said that during the meetings 
Gorbachev had stated, "Surveying the experiments of 1956 and 1968 
... no external force can interfere in the domestic issues of socialist 
countries."100 This was extremely significant. The head of the Soviet 
Union told another head of state that a past application of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine was not justified. How then could the policy be 
presently justified?
That is naturally what the Hungarians (not to mention the rest 
of the East bloc) wanted to know. The most important conclusion 
drawn after the Grosz-Gorbachev talks was made by Major. He 
stated unequivocally that the Brezhnev Doctrine was dead.109 10 In 
previous years, this would have been considered heresy, but the 
Soviets never even reprimanded Grosz for his conclusions. Surely if 
the Soviets were serious about continuing the Brezhnev Doctrine, a
109Henry Kamm, The New York Times. 4/2/89. 15.
110lbid.
policy Nsec) on intimidation, they would have violently rejected 
Grosz’s remarks. The rest of the bloc looked on, drawing the
appropriate conclusions.
In July, Gorbachev traveled to Strasbourg, France. There he 
would continue to talk about his philosophy of a Common Ruropean 
Home. This concept precluded the ' very probability of the use of 
force or threat of force. Alliance against alliance, inside the alliance, 
wherever."111 Furthermore, "Any interference in domestic affairs
and any attempts to restrict the sovereignty of states friends, allies 
or any other - are inadmissible.’’112 These words contradicted the 
inherent philosophy of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which stated that it 
the commonwealth was endangered, intervention was justified. The 
Economist declared that the speech represented, "The closest he 
IGorbachev) has yet come in public to renouncing the Brezhnev
Doctrine."113 This change of policy was even further revealed when 
Gorbachev uttered, "Social and political orders in one country or 
another changed in the past and may change in the future ... but this 
change is the exclusive affair of the people in that country and is 
their choice."114 Thus, it would seem that the Soviet Union would be 
willing to allow this "change” to occur, even within the states of the 
socialist commonwealth.
As if to reiterate his point, two days later in Bucharest, 
Gorbachev would speak along the same lines. Denying that the
11 Dames Markham, The New York Times. 7/7/K9. p. 1.
112lb»d.
m Thc Economist. 7/15/89. p. 41.
" 4Markham. The New York Timcs.7/7/89. p. 6.
Soviet Union was the head of an international socialist movement 
that had the right to intervene in others' affairs, Gorbachev stated, 
"There are no universal models of socialism; nobody is the holder of 
truth ... relations should develop on the basis of equality, 
independence and each one’s right to make its own political line, 
strategy and tactics, without any outside interference."115
Thus, within two days, Gorbachev virtually rejected the 
Brezhnev Doctrine in a Western city and in a city in the East bloc. It 
is hard to imagine that he would say such things simply to obtain 
further diplomatic support from the West. If this were the case, the 
remarks in Strasbourg could be explained, but why utter such words 
in Bucharest? Within the East bloc itself, Gorbachev had made it 
clear both to the reformers, like Grosz, and the old Stalinists, like 
Ceausescu, that change was imminent.
The ..Chalk m ie ,.i,o, the..Rhsaork
Up to now, the challenge to the Brezhnev Doctrine had largely 
been rhetorical and based on reassessments of past actions. Poland 
would be the first country in the alliance to test Moscow and see if 
Gorbachev meant what he said about non-interference.
In June 1989, Poland would hold historic elections. In the 
Polish Upper House 99 out of KM) solidarity members were elected. 
In the Sejm 33 out of 35 communist officials lost their seats when 
voters simply crossed their names out and refused to cast a vote for 
them .116 It was apparent that if the system was completely 
liberalized, the communists would lose power. The election also
115Craig R. Whitney. The New York Times. 7/9/89. p. 3.
116Gati, p. 167.
paved the way for the first coalition government in Poland since the 
Soviet occupation after World War II. By August, it appeared that 
non-communists could head the Polish government. Many Polish 
communists grumbled and did not want Tadeusz Mazowiecki. former 
advisor to Lech Walesa, to join the government. In August,
Gorbachev called Rakowski and told him that it was appropriate for 
Mazowiecki to take power.117 Not only did Gorbachev not threaten 
the Polish communists with intervention <br letting their domestic 
situation deteriorate, Gorbachev condoned the recent events. Soviet 
inaction towards, or even assistance to, non-communist elements in 
Poland set in motion the rapid events that would engulf the entire 
region.
In mid-August, Jaruzclski opened talks with Solidarity leaders. 
In Moscow there was silence. Yevgeny Primakov announced, "This is 
entirely a matter to be decided by Poland."118 On August 18, 1989, 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki was nominated as Prime Minister. The Soviets 
responded, not by sending tanks, but by sending congratulations,
"The traditional relations of friendship and all-around cooperation 
between the Soviet Union and Poland will continue developing on the 
basis of sovereign equality.",19
It is important to realize that the Soviet acceptance of the
Polish situation did not have to inevitably lead to a bloc-wide 
revolution against the imposed Soviet rule. Had this been the case, 
Moscow may have acted differently. There were reasons to see the
1I7FB1S • EEU - 89 - 162 . 8/23/89. p. 45.
H *Thc New York Times. 8/18/89. p. 6.
119Keller, The New York Times. 8/25/89. p. 8.
Polish experiment carried out. Polish reforms could be monitored, 
and valuable information could be gained for the Soviets. Perhaps, 
too, Moscow felt the Polish crisis was so severe that the non­
communist leaders in Poland were doomed to failure, and it would be 
good politics to let them have power so that they would be blamed 
for the Polish situation. Finally, Gorbachev could have been ’’trying 
to shape control of the evolution that seems inevitable.”120 This was 
probably not the case since even Gorbachev probably did not sense 
that within six months all of the regimes in the area would change.
There was one continuity in Soviet policy. From the assurances 
of Mazowiecki and Walesa in August, it was apparent that Poland 
would remain in the Warsaw Pact. Thus, Gorbachev acted like his 
predecessors and demanded that the alliance be kept intact. It is 
important to note that Soviet acceptance of a non-communist 
government in Poland in August, 1989, did not inevitably lead to the 
Warsaw Pact's dissolving in 1991, A further history could be written 
on this phenomenon, but for our purposes, it is important to note 
that even while the Brezhnev Doctrine was eroding in 1989, the 
emphasis on the Warsaw Pact still existed.
M ore H istorical Reassessm ents
We are not waving a conductor's baton.
--- Gennadi Gerasimov
On August 17, 1989, the Polish Sejm officially condemned the 
1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. This act was a
120Kcllcr, The New York Times. 8/25/89. p. 8.
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renunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine itself. It is interesting to note 
that while this occurred, the G.D.R. defended the 1968 action and 
claimed that the Czechoslovak government was legitimate. Thus, 
throughout the East bloc, there was debate on what activities were 
legal since the Soviets were no longer providing the leadership.
Many regimes were desperately supporting the Brezhnev Doctrine to 
preserve the status quo.
In fact, the Soviets were also reappraising their own policy. 
Eduard Shevardnadze commented on October 23, 1989, "We violated 
the norms of proper behavior. We went against general human 
values. I, am talking, of course, about the dispatch of troops to 
Afghanistan. We committed the most serious violations of our 
legislation, our party and civilian norms."121 There was a certain 
degree of symbolism in that Shevardnadze uttered these words in 
reference to Afghanistan during the anniversary of the Soviet 
invasion of Hungary. As Shevardnadze was apologizing for one 
illegal invasion, the citizens in Hungary were remembering the 
victims of another. In Hungary, flags flew without the hammer and 
sickle, and many buildings had the words "socialist people's" name 
scrapped off so that only Republic and Hungary were visible. It was 
obvious that while Shevardnadze addressed the Afghan issue, he also 
hinted that the Soviets were condoning the changes going on in 
Hungary as well.
121 Keller, The New York Times. 10/24/89. p.14.
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The S inatra D octrine
By now, many were proclaiming the death of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine. After all, the Soviets had disavowed their role as the chief 
force in the world socialist movement, allowed non-communists to 
come to power in Poland, allowed Hungary to reevaluate their 
history and had admitted that it was wrong to invade Afghanistan.
All of these were important acts that convinced many that the 
Brezhnev Doctrine was dead. The first Soviet official to admit this 
was Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, the Deputy Chief at the Soviet Institute 
of the World Socialist System. Quite frankly, Ambartsumov stated, 
"The Brezhnev doctrine is dead, though, the official death notice has 
not yet been published.’122 123 He continued, "fivents such as the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia will never again be repeated."122 
"Gorbachev"', he finished, "is opposed to the rationale, method, and 
system that led to the tragic events in 1968."124 To Ambartsumov,
Gorbachev would not invoke the Brezhnev Doctrine.
This assessment was wholeheartedly endorsed by Gennadi 
Gerasimov who stated, "I think the Brezhnev Doctrine is dead.’’125 As 
if to poke fun at this obvious point, Gerasimov slated that the Soviet 
Union no longer espoused the Brezhnev Doctrine, opting instead for 
the "Sinatra Doctrine." As Gerasimov stated, Hungary and Poland 
were "doing it their way."126 Gerasimov did not wish to alter the 
Soviet desire to keep the Warsaw Pact alliance intact. While
122FBIS - SU- 8/16/89. p. 27.
123lbid.
124lbid. p. 28.
125Kcllcr, The New York Times. 10/26/89. p. I.
126lbid.
Gerasimov did state, MWe have no right, moral or political right, to 
interfere in events happening there,” he added, ”We may witness a 
change of government in Warsaw or Budapest, but international 
obligations do not necessarily go away with a change of 
government.”127 Gerasimov was simply stating what had been Soviet 
policy since 1988. The Soviet Union would not intervene, but it 
expected the Eastern European states, whoever was in charge, to 
remain in the Soviet alliance.
This is further illustrated by Marshal Sergei E. Akhromeyev, 
who stated in November, 1989, ”Now the governments in Poland and 
Hungary have changed. There are non-communists at the heads of 
governments. But the state interests of Poland and Hungary have 
remained the same, to a significant degree.Ml 28 Thus, at the end of 
1989, the Soviets had achieved their goal - the continuance of the 
Warsaw Pact, By 1991 this goal and the formal alliance would 
disappear.
Many things were disappearing in these rapidly changing, 
exciting times. The most symbolic event occurred in November, 
1989. The Berlin Wall was opened. Throngs of people rushed into 
the streets of Berlin to celebrate, and the Soviets did nothing to ruin 
the party. In one symbolic gesture, the distance between the East 
and West was narrowed, and with the opening of a wall, the end of
the Cold War was near.
Just as it was difficult to point to the beginning of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine, it is difficult to determine a date of its discontinuation. It
127 Keller, The New York Times. 10/26/89. p. 13.
128 Keller, The New York Times. 11/30/89.
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should be obvious that in 1989, the Brezhnev Doctrine was never 
used. Events were allowed to run their own course, and the Soviets 
stayed aloof. Privately, some even declared the Brezhnev Doctrine's 
death, but it was never officially disavowed. The closest official
retraction came at a Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow on December 4, 
1989. The Pact officially condemned the 1968 invasion of 
Czechoslovakia. Thus, the act that became synonymous with the 
Brezhnev Doctrine was now officially condemned by a body that 
included a Soviet representative. The statement read, "The bringing 
of armies of five socialist countries into Czechoslovak territory in 
1968 was unfounded and that that decision, in light of all the 
presently known facts, was erroneous."129 Thus, the official death 
notice had arrived. The Brezhnev Doctrine was dead.
N a t i o n a l i t i e s
It is important to contrast the Soviet reaction to the 
liberalization in Poland and Hungary to the reaction to many 
domestic elements in Soviet society who demanded more autonomy. 
It is ironic that during the process when the Soviets were 
reevaluating their policy of coercion towards the Warsaw Pact 
members, they dealt with Lithuanian, Estonian, Latvian, Georgian, 
Armenian, Azerbaijani, and other internal minorities with military 
ruthlessness. There, as of yet, is no change of policy towards 
different republics within the Soviet Union. These republics are still 
a part of the Soviet empire. As Zbigniew Brzezinski stated, "Official
129-warsaw Pact Condemns 1968 Prague Invasion," The New York Times. 
12/5/89. p. 12.
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tolerance has its limits."1™ Inside the borders of the Soviet Union, 
dissension would be put down. Outside the borders of the Soviet 
Union was another story.
The Spark
It was clear that the fundamental reasons to invoke the 
Brezhnev Doctrine had been eroded by the time Gorbachev ascended 
to power. Thus, a necessary, but not sufficient, condition existed for 
the demise of the policy. However, Gorbachev could have still opted 
to invoke the policy out of bureaucratic inertia or personal 
preference. Indeed, the stage was set for the doctrine to fall into 
disuse, but the exact timing depended on the new man in the 
Kremlin.
Indeed, Gorbachev was a new man. A fresh figure after the 
years of Brezhnev’s stagnation, Gorbachevs youth and energy 
contrasted with the lethargy of Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko. 
With youth came a different perspective. Gorbachev was the first 
leader of the CPSU that essentially did not experience the Great 
Patriotic War. This is significant. It seems absurd to imagine 
Gorbachev lecturing Husak about the sacrifices of the Soviet Red 
Army, in the manner that Brezhnev did with with Dubcek. Indeed, 
the nostalgic reasons for Gorbachev to invoke the doctrine had faded 
into oblivion,
It would be an understatement to say that Gorbachev was a 
catalyst in the events that would occur in Eastern Europe. It was his 
policies of xlasnost, perestroika, his "new thinking" that created the
130 John Tagliabuc, The New York Times. 10/16/88 p. I.
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setting for East bloc defections. His talk of a European Common Home 
captured the imagination of millions in the region. His tolerance 
would allow a poet, a former inmate, to rise to be head of state of
non-communist Czechoslovakia. Gorbachev did not create these 
events. He merely gave the impression that he would no longer 
crack down if they occurred. It is important to note that G orbachev 
most likely had to be firm against internal opposition. It is safe to 
assume that Ligaehev would have argued for the use of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine against Poland in 1989. Gorbachev was a strong enough 
leader to win his way on most issues.
As Gati states, "The region had always smoldered with rage 
beneath the surface; that it would ignite one day was never in 
doubt."131 Gorbachev's policies merely emboldened leaders in the 
region to test Moscow's tolerance. When they did, they came to the 
correct conclusion that they would not be stopped. As this became 
apparent, non-communists throughout the region clamored for 
power, and the East bloc had fallen apart.
Why? Eastern Europe never liked the imposed system. For the 
Soviets there were many reasons. First, there was no longer any 
reason to administer the bloc in the previous manner. It had become 
an economic burden, and its defensive advantages were becoming 
obsolete. There also seemed to be a lack of ideological cohesion in 
the bloc. Could the Soviets really invade Poland for attempting to
reform its political structure after Gorbachev himself was planning to 
do the same for Moscow? Finally, and most importantly, Gorbachev s
13lGati, p. 190.
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primary concern was the economic recovery of the Soviet Union. AH 
policies were designed to meet this goal. Thus, if Eastern Europe 
succeeded in reform, it would help the Soviet Union.
Reform was actually promoted. When East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia resisted, Soviet troops were removed to remind those 
leaders of how fragile their regimes were without Soviet support. 
Thus, Gorbachev encouraged reform. He convinced Rakowski to 
permit Mazowiecki to join the government. He did this, not because 
he wanted to destroy the East bloc, but because he was obsessed 
with its economic recovery. These states all publicly stated their 
continued willingness to remain a part of the WTO (although within 
18 months this organization would disband). This was all Moscow 
wanted: halfhearted support for the WTO, which would buy time for 
economic reform to work. Therefore, while it is true that the 
Brezhnev Doctrine should not have been a policy employed in the 
Kremlin in the 1990s, Gorbachev’s policies hastened its demise.
A global failure?
The year 1917 marked the beginning of socialist ideology 
becoming infused into the modern state. The Soviet Union (or what 
would later come to be known as the Soviet Union) was created.
Over fifty years before, a German intellectual, researching in a 
library, declared the evils and inherent contradictions within 
capitalism. He was Karl Marx. Marx called for the inevitable historic 
transformation into a socialist world, in which there would be eternal 
bliss.
A revolutionary would incorporate these views and form a 
tight cadre. He altered the premise of Marx’s earlier works.
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Revolution became the primary method to promote the transition 
from capitalism to communism. Seizing power "on the street," V.I. 
Lenin would create the first socialist state.
Marxism-Leninism has been the guiding philosophy for the 
Soviet Union since the revolution. It was then imposed on the 
Eastern European countries after World War II. In order to ensure 
that these countries would remain true to their dogma, force was 
required. This was the essence of the Brezhnev Doctrine-the East 
bloc had to be threatened in order to continue espousing the Soviet 
line.
Some, like Zbigniew Brzezinski, would argue that the entire 
ideology of communism has failed. The failure of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine should be seen as an example of this. Brzezinski writes with 
obvious disdain for the ideology that he calls "the twentieth century’s 
most extraordinary political and intellectual aberration.”* 1*2 Writing 
before the events in Eastern Europe, Brzezinski describes the 
"terminal crisis of communism."1** To him, communism represents 
the failure of state control over society. Communism was the "grand 
oversimplification" which de-emphasized the individual spirit. 
Nowhere on the globe was the lure of Marxism-Leninism on the 
upswing. In fact, it was being rejected everywhere.
Thus, to Brzezinski, the case of Eastern Europe should not be 
viewed in isolation. The death of the Brezhnev Doctrine was 
inevitable. Moscow could not have held Eastern Europe forever. 
Eastern Europe was an artificial concept imposed by the Soviets and
^B rzez in sk i, p. I.
1**lbid.
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eventually these states would begin to look towards the West. 
Hungary did not take pride that she was more advanced than 
Romania, she was upset to see Austria progress so far ahead of her. 
Czechoslovakia was advanced for a socialist state, but it used to be an
economic power. Indeed before World War II, she was the sixth or 
seventh most industrialized state in the world; a distant memory.1*4 
Also, the region was never united. Hungarians would still covet 
Transylvania, and other border disputes were bound to erupt. One 
thing stood in the way of Hungarian territorial and economic 
demands: Soviet-sponsored socialism. Thus, the Brezhnev Doctrine 
was an attempt to impose an artificial Mpax socialista" on the region. 
It failed.
Conclusion
The Brezhnev Doctrine was the cornerstone of Soviet foreign 
policy throughout most of the post-war period. It provided a 
justification for the entrenchment of the Soviet empire. The Hast bloc 
was bound to the Soviet Union by threat of military force. The 
reasons for the espousal of this policy were similar to the ones Stalin 
used when he first created the bloc. The Soviets gained by having 
Bastern Europe firmly under their control. Although Khrushchev let 
these nations gravitate, he was forced to use military means with 
Hungary in 1956. This followed the precedent that Stalin began in 
1953. Soviet force would be used to keep stability within the 
empire. When this was done again in 1968, the policy was given a 
name -the Brezhnev Doctrine.
1 *4Gat», p. 44.
79
The Brezhnev Doctrine did not mark a break with previous 
policy. Nor was it a static policy. It was swiftly applied in Hungary, 
while hesitantly, and only indirectly in Poland in 1980-81. The 
Soviets began to realize that force was not always reliable in 
Afghanistan and started to question their policy. Despite the experts 
who claimed otherwise, Gorbachev after 1987 never intended to 
invoke the time-tested policy. Needing time to cure his country 
economically, Gorbachev altered the Soviet conception of security 
and threw the Brezhnev Doctrine into the "ash heap of history."
it is impossible to determine the future effects of this decision. 
It definitely has emboldened national ethnic leaders to press their 
demands. The situation is paradoxical. Gorbachev did not invoke the 
doctrine in an attempt to improve his country's economy, but by not 
invoking the policy, he may have set in motion the forces that will 
destroy the very same entity he wished to protect. Toqueville's 
comment may prove prophetic in that, by reforming, the Soviet 
Union has "lost." Only the future will tell whether the Soviet Union 
simply lost the Cold War or if it has lost its right to exist as a single 
independent political entity.
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